GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Faculty Scholarship

2015

First Report of the Special Rapporteur on Crimes against
Humanity
Sean D. Murphy
George Washington University Law School, smurphy@law.gwu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Murphy, Sean D., First Report of the Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity (February 17, 2015).
United Nations International Law Commission, A/CN.4/680; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No.
2015-12; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2015-12. Available at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2598533

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu.

A/CN.4/680

United Nations

General Assembly

Distr.: General
17 February 2015
Original: English

International Law Commission
Sixty-seventh session
Geneva, 4 May-5 June and 6 July-7 August 2015

First report on crimes against humanity
By Sean D. Murphy, Special Rapporteur *

* The Special Rapporteur wishes to thank Daniel Aum, Jennifer Babaie, Gwendelynn Bills, Arturo
Carrillo, Túlio Di Giacomo Toledo, Anne Dienelt, Joshua Doherty, Sarah Freuden, Beatrice Gatti,
Caitlin Johnson, Larry Johnson, Annalise Nelson, Darryl Robinson, Leila Sadat, Elizabeth
Santalla, Herb Somers, Jennifer Summerville, Larissa van den Herik, Beth Van Sc haack, Laura
Withers and the George Washington University Human Rights Clinic for their invaluable
assistance in the preparation of the present report.

15-02139 (E)

310315

*1502139*

A/CN.4/680

Contents
Page

I.

II.

III.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

A.

Inclusion of the topic in the Commission’s programme of work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

B.

Purpose and structure of the present report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

Why a convention on crimes against humanity? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

A.

Objectives of a convention on crimes against humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

B.

Reactions by States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

C.

Relationship of a convention on crimes against humanity to other treaties, including the
Rome Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

Background to crimes against humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

A.

Concept of crimes against humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

B.

Historical emergence of the prohibition of crimes against humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

C.

Crimes against humanity before contemporary international and special courts and
tribunals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

Crimes against humanity in national law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

Existing multilateral conventions that promote prevention, criminalization and inter -State
cooperation with respect to crimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

A.

1948 Genocide Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

B.

1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

C.

Other potentially relevant conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

Preventing and punishing crimes against humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

A.

Obligation to prevent crimes against humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

1.

Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

2.

Comments by treaty bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

3.

United Nations resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

4.

Case law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47

5.

Publicists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

Obligation to prevent and punish crimes against humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

1.

General obligation to prevent and punish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54

2.

Specific measures for prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54

3.

Non-derogation provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

Draft article 1: Preventing and punishing crimes against humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

Definition of crimes against humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

“Widespread or systematic” attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

60

D.
IV.

V.

B.

C.
VI.

A.

2/88

15-02139

A/CN.4/680

VII.

B.

“Directed against any civilian population” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

C.

Non-State actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

70

D.

“With knowledge of the attack” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

E.

Types of prohibited acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

74

F.

Draft article 2: Definition of crimes against humanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

84

Future programme of work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

86

Proposed draft articles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

Annex

15-02139

3/88

A/CN.4/680

I. Introduction
A.

Inclusion of the topic in the Commission’s programme of work
1.
At its sixty-fifth session, in 2013, the International Law Commission decided
to place the topic “Crimes against humanity” on its long-term programme of work. 1
After debate within the Sixth Committee in 2013, 2 the General Assembly took note
of this development. 3 At its sixty-sixth session, in 2014, the Commission decided to
move this topic onto its current programme of work and to appoint a Special
Rapporteur. After debate within the Sixth Committee in 2014, the General Assembly
took note of this step as well. 4

B.

Purpose and structure of the present report
2.
The purpose of the present report is to address the potential benefits of
developing draft articles that might serve as the basis of an international convention
on crimes against humanity. Further, the report provides general background with
respect to the emergence of the concept of crimes against humanity as an aspect of
international law, its application by international courts and tribunals and its
incorporation in the national laws of some States. Ultimately, the report proposes
two draft articles: one on prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity
and the other on the definition of such crimes.
3.
Section II of this report assesses the potential benefits resulting from a
convention on crimes against humanity, which, if adhered to by States, include
promoting the adoption of national laws that contain a widely accepted definition of
such crimes and that allow for a broad ambit of jurisdiction when an offender is
present in territory under the jurisdiction of the State party. Such a convention could
also contain provisions obligating States parties to prevent crimes against humanity,
to cooperate on mutual legal assistance for the investigation and prosecution of such
crimes in national courts and to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders. This
section notes the reactions of States in 2013-2014 to the Commission’s selection of
this topic, which were largely favourable, but which in some instances raised
questions about the relationship of such a convention to other treaty regimes.
4.
Consequently, section II also considers the relationship of such a convention to
other treaty regimes, notably the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court. 5 The International Criminal Court stands at the centre of efforts to

__________________
1

2

3
4

5
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See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Fifth Session, U.N.
GAOR, 68th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/68/10, at 116, para. 170 and Annex B (2013).
See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty -Third and Sixty-Fifth
Sessions: Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the General
Assembly During Its Sixty-Eighth Session, Prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/666,
at 17-18, para. 72 (2014) (hereinafter “Topical Summary”); see also infra Part II(B).
See G.A. Res. 68/112, para. 8 (Dec. 18, 2013).
See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty -Sixth Session,
U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/69/10, at 247, para. 266 (2014) (hereinafter
“2014 Report”); G.A. Res. 69/118, para. 7 (Dec. 10, 2014). For discussion of the debate in the
Sixth Committee, see infra Part II(B).
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (hereinafter
“Rome Statute”).
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address genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and is one of the
signature achievements in the field of international law. With 122 States parties as at
January 2015, the Rome Statute provides a critical means for investigating and
prosecuting these crimes at the international level. A convention on crimes against
humanity could help promote the investigation and prosecution of such crimes at the
national level, thereby enhancing the complementarity system upon whic h the
International Criminal Court is built, as well as promoting inter-State cooperation
not addressed by the Rome Statute.
5.
Section III of this report provides general background with respect to the
emergence of crimes against humanity as a concept of international law, including
its progression from a crime associated with international armed conflict to a crime
that can occur whenever there is a widespread or systematic attack directed against
a civilian population by means of certain heinous acts. Further, section III notes the
existence and application of crimes against humanity by contemporary international
criminal tribunals, including the International Criminal Court. As noted above, the
Court is built upon the principle of complementarity, whereb y in the first instance
the relevant crimes should be prosecuted in national courts, if national authorities
are able and willing to investigate and prosecute the crime. With that in mind,
section III also considers whether States have adopted national laws on crimes
against humanity; whether those laws coincide with the definition of these crimes
contained in article 7 of the Rome Statute; and whether those laws provide the State
with the means to exercise jurisdiction over crimes occurring in its territor y, crimes
committed by its nationals, crimes that harm its nationals and/or crimes committed
abroad by non-nationals against non-nationals in situations where the offender is
present in the State’s territory.
6.
Section IV notes that a wide range of existing multilateral conventions can
serve as potential models for a convention on crimes against humanity, including
those that promote prevention, criminalization and inter-State cooperation with
respect to transnational crimes. Such conventions address offen ces such as
genocide, war crimes, State-sponsored torture, enforced disappearance,
transnational corruption and organized crime, crimes against internationally
protected persons and terrorism-related offences. Likewise, multilateral conventions
on extradition, mutual legal assistance and statutes of limitation can provide
important guidance with respect to those issues.
7.
Section V assesses the general obligation that exists in various treaty regimes
for States to prevent and punish crimes. Since the obligation to punish is to be
addressed in greater detail in subsequent draft articles, this part focuses on the
obligation to prevent as it exists in numerous multilateral treaties, and considers the
contours of such an obligation as discussed in the comments of treaty bodies, United
Nations resolutions, case law and the writings of publicists. In light of such
information, section V proposes an initial draft article that broadly addresses
“prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity”.
8.
Section VI turns to the definition of “crimes against humanity” for the purpose
of the present draft articles. Article 7 of the Rome Statute marks the culmination of
almost a century of development of the concept of crimes against humanity and
expresses the core elements of the crime. In particular, the crime involves a
“widespread or systematic attack”; an attack “directed against any civilian
population”, which means a course of conduct “pursuant to or in furtherance of a

15-02139
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State or organizational policy to commit such attack”; a perpetrator who has
“knowledge of the attack”; and an attack that occurs by means of the multiple
commission of certain specified acts, such as murder, torture or rape. Contemporary
case law of the International Criminal Court is refining and cl arifying the meaning
of such terms, relying to a degree on the jurisprudence of earlier tribunals. In
recognition that the definition contained in article 7 of the Rome Statute is now
widely accepted among States, and out of a desire to promote harmony bet ween
national and international efforts to address the crime, the proposed draft article
uses the exact same definition of “crimes against humanity” as appears in article 7,
except for three non-substantive changes that are necessary given the different
context in which the definition is being used (such as replacing references to
“Statute” with “present draft articles”).
9.
Finally, section VII briefly addresses the future programme of work on this
topic.

II. Why a convention on crimes against humanity?
A.

Objectives of a convention on crimes against humanity
10. As noted in the proposal for the topic adopted by the Commission at its
sixty-fifth session in 2013, in the field of international law three core crimes generally
make up the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals: war crimes; genocide; and
crimes against humanity. Only two of these crimes (war crimes and genocide) are the
subject of a global treaty that requires States to prevent and punish such conduct and
to cooperate among themselves toward those ends. By contrast, there is no such treaty
dedicated to preventing and punishing crimes against humanity.
11. Yet crimes against humanity may be more prevalent than either genocide or
war crimes. Such crimes may occur in situations not involving armed conflict and
do not require the special intent that is necessary for establishing genocide. 6
Moreover, treaties focused on prevention, punishment and inter-State cooperation
exist for many far less egregious offences, such as corruption, bribery or organized
crime. While some treaties address offences, such as State -sponsored torture or
enforced disappearance of persons, which under certain conditions might also
constitute crimes against humanity, those treaties do not address c rimes against
humanity as such.
12. As such, a global convention on prevention, punishment and inter-State
cooperation with respect to crimes against humanity appears to be a key missing
piece in the current framework of international law and, in particular, internat ional
humanitarian law, international criminal law and international human rights law.

__________________
6
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See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, para. 139 (hereinafter 2015 Croatia v. Serbia
Genocide Judgment) (“The Court recalls that, in 2007, it held that the intent to destroy a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such is specific to genocide and distinguishes it
from other related criminal acts such as crimes against humanity and persecution.”) (citing to
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 43, at
paras. 187-188 (hereinafter 2007 Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro Genocide
Judgment)).
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Such a convention could help to stigmatize such egregious conduct, could draw
further attention to the need for its prevention and punishment and could help to
adopt and harmonize national laws relating to such conduct, thereby opening the
door to more effective inter-State cooperation on prevention, investigation,
prosecution and extradition for such crimes. In building a network of cooperation,
as has been done with respect to other offences, sanctuary would be denied to
offenders, thereby — it is hoped — helping both to deter such conduct ab initio and
to ensure accountability ex post. 7
13. Hence, the overall objective for this topic will be to draft articles for what
could become a convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against
humanity (hereinafter “convention on crimes against humanity” or “convention”).
Using the definition of crimes against humanity embodied in the Rome Statute, the
convention could require all States parties to take effective measures to prevent
crimes against humanity in any territory under their jurisdiction. One such measure
would be for States parties to criminalize the offence in its entirety in their national
law, a step that most States have not yet taken. Further, the convention could require
each State party to exercise jurisdiction not just with respect to acts that occur on its
territory or by its nationals, but also with respect to acts committed abroad by
non-nationals who later are present in territory under the State party’s jurisdiction.
14. Moreover, the convention could require robust inter-State cooperation by the
parties for investigation, prosecution and punishment of the offence, including
through the provision of mutual legal assistance and extradition. The convention
could also impose an aut dedere aut judicare obligation when an alleged offender is
present in territory under a State party’s jurisdiction. The convention could also
contain other relevant obligations, such as an obligation for compulsory dispute
settlement between States parties whenever a dispute arises with respect to the
interpretation or application of the convention.
15. The convention would not address other serious crimes, such as genocide or
war crimes, which are already the subject of widely-adhered-to global treaties
relating to their prevention and punishment. An argument can be made that existing
global treaties on genocide and war crimes could be updated through a new
instrument, and there is support among some States 8 and non-State actors 9 for an
__________________
7

8

9

15-02139

For calls within the academic community for such a convention, see M.C. Bassiouni, “‘Crimes
against Humanity’: The Need for a Specialized Convention,” Columbia J. of Transnat’l L.,
vol. 31, p. 457 (1994); M.C. Bassiouni, “Crimes against Humanity: the Case for a Specialized
Convention,” Washington University Global Studies L. Rev., vol. 9, p. 575 (2010); L. Sadat
(ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity (Cambridge University Press, 2011)
(completed as part of an initiative of the Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute at Washington
University in St. Louis); M. Bergsmo & T. Song (eds.), On the Proposed Crimes Against
Humanity Convention (Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2014).
See “Towards a Multilateral Treaty for Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition for Domestic
Prosecution of the Most Serious International Crimes,” a non-paper informally circulated by
Argentina, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Slovenia at the Si xth Committee in November 2013.
A resolution on this initiative was presented before the UN Conference on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), but was withdrawn after extensive debate in the Committee of the
Whole, where several delegations raised “serious concerns” regarding the competence of the
CCPCJ in this matter. See CCPCJ Report on the Twenty-Second Session (7 December 2012 and
22-26 April 2013), Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Supp. No. 10,
U.N. Doc. E/2013/30, paras. 64-66 (2013).
See M. Zgonec-Rožej and J. Foakes, International Criminals: Extradite or Prosecute?, Chatham
House Briefing Paper No. IL BP 2013/01, at 16 (July 2013).
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expanded initiative of that kind. Bearing in mind that several States have suggested
that work on this topic should complement rather than overlap with existing legal
regimes, 10 the present topic focuses on the most prominent gap in such regimes,
where the need for a new instrument appears the greatest. The Commission, of
course, remains open to the views of States and others as it proceeds with this topic,
and ultimately it will be for States to decide whether the scope of the Commission’s
work is optimal.

B.

Reactions by States
16. In the course of the debate within the Sixth Committee in the fall of 2013,
several delegations supported adding the topic of crimes against humanity to the
Commission’s agenda, 11 and noted the value of having such a convention. For
example, the Nordic countries indicated that:
[R]obust inter-State cooperation for the purposes of investigation, prosecution
and punishment of these crimes is crucial, as is the obligation to extradite or
prosecute alleged offenders, regardless of their nationality. It is therefore
important that the Commission’s work on Crimes against humanity include a
legal analysis of the obligation to extradite or prosecute. Moreover, it is
equally important that clear principles on the latter be identified. Additional
clarity on the scope of application of this obligation would help to ensure
maximum effect and compliance with existing rules. 12
17. At the same time, other delegations cautioned that such a convention must be
addressed in a prudent manner, 13 with a particular emphasis on avoiding any
conflicts with existing international regimes, including the International Criminal
Court. 14 A few delegations expressed doubts about whether a convention on this

__________________
10
11

12

13

14
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See, e.g., Topical Summary, supra note 2, at 18, para. 72.
Austria (A/C.6/68/SR.17, para. 74); Czech Republic (A/C.6/68/SR.18, para. 102); Italy
(A/C.6/68/SR.19, para. 10); Japan (available at https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/
703457/japan-part-1.pdf); Mongolia (A/C.6/68/SR.19, para. 79); Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway and Sweden (per Norway, A/C.6/68/SR.17, para. 36); Peru (A/C.6/68/SR.18, para. 28);
United States (A/C.6/68/SR.17, para. 51).
Statement to the Sixth Committee by Norway on behalf of the Nordic Countries, at 5 (Oct. 28,
2013), available at https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703463/norway-part-1.pdf.
China (A/C.6/68/SR.19, para. 61); India (ibid., para. 21); Malaysia (ibid., para. 33); Romania
(A/C.6/68/SR.18, para. 116); Spain (A/C.6/68/SR.17, para. 133); United Kingdom
(A/C.6/68/SR.18, para. 22).
See, e.g., Statement to the Sixth Committee by Malaysia, para. 3 (Oct. 30, 2013), available at
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703723/malaysia-rev.pdf (“Malaysia is of the view
that the study should not undermine the intended universality of the Rome Statute. In addition,
any further work on this should not overlap with existing regimes, but rather to complement
it.”); Statement to the Sixth Committee by the United Kingdom (Oct. 28-30, 2013), available at
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703573/uk-rev.pdf (stressing “that any new
conventions in this area must be consistent with and complementary to the ICC Statute ”);
Statement to the Sixth Committee by Spain, at 2 (Oct. 28, 2013), available at
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703785/spain-e.pdf (“should [this ILC topic] be
undertaken, it will require a careful analysis both of the specific limitation aspects to be
included in the relevant Convention and, particularly, its precise relationship with the Rome
Statute and the role of the International Criminal Court without overstepping their provisions. ”);
Statement to the Sixth Committee by Norway (on behalf of the Nordic countries), supra note 12:
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topic was really needed, 15 while a few others supported the drafting of a new
convention but with a scope wider than crimes against humanity. 16
18. Most of the 23 States that addressed the issue before the Sixth Committee in
the fall of 2014 welcomed the inclusion of this topic on the Commission’s current
programme of work. 17 Three States did not expressly support the topic, but
acknowledged that a gap exists in current treaty regimes with respect to crimes
against humanity, which can benefit from further study, 18 while yet another State
maintained that the topic should be “treated with great caution”. 19 Four States,
however, expressed the view that there exists no lacuna in the existing international
law framework in relation to crimes against humanity, given the existence of the
Rome Statute. 20 Finally, two States favoured pursuing a new convention, but in an
alternative forum and with an alternative approach that would emphasize a wider
range of crimes, but for narrower purposes limited to extradition and mutual legal
assistance. 21
19. In commenting favourably, States mentioned that work on this topic would
help develop international criminal law 22 and would build upon the Commission’s
prior work, 23 such as by considering how an extradite-or-prosecute regime might
operate for crimes against humanity. 24 At the same time, several States expressed
the view that work on this topic must avoid conflicts with existing legal
instruments, notably the Rome Statute. 25 On balance, the views of Governments at
present appear to be that there is value in developing a new convention, but that it
must be pursued carefully, with particular attention to its relationship to existing
international regimes, especially the Rome Statute.
__________________

15

16
17

18

19
20

21
22
23
24

25

15-02139

[W]hile development on this topic towards a further operationalization of the recognition
of a duty of prevention and obligations of inter-state cooperation is highly welcome, the
Nordic states underline that no such obligations can be construed so as t o limit either
already existing, similar obligations vis-à-vis other crimes, or already existing legal
obligations in this field.
France (A/C.6/68/SR.17, para. 106); Iran (Islamic Republic of) (available at
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/1156427/iran.pdf, at 7); Russian Federation
(A/C.6/68/SR.19, para. 56); South Africa (A/C.6/68/SR.18, paras. 51-58).
Netherlands (A/C.6/68/SR.18, para. 37); Slovenia (A/C.6/68/SR.21, para. 56).
Austria (A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 111); Croatia (A/C.6/69/SR.20, paras. 92-93); Czech Republic
(ibid., para. 10); El Salvador (ibid., para. 91); Finland on behalf of the Nordic countries
(A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 81); Israel (A/C.6/69/SR.20, para. 67); Jamaica (A/C.6/69/SR.27,
para. 33); Japan (A/C.6/69/SR.20, para. 49); Republic of Korea (A/C.6/69/SR.21, para. 45);
Mongolia (A/C.6/69/SR.24, para. 94); New Zealand (A/C.6/69/SR.21, para. 33); Poland
(A/C.6/69/SR.20, para. 36); Spain (A/C.6/69/SR.21, para. 42); Trinidad and Tobago
(A/C.6/69/SR.26, para. 118); United States (A/C.6/69/SR.20, para. 121).
Chile (A/C.6/69/SR.24, para. 52); Italy (A/C.6/69/SR.22, para. 53); United Kingdom
(A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 160).
Romania (A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 147).
France (A/C.6/69/SR.22, para. 37); Malaysia (A/C.6/69/SR.27, para. 54); Netherlands
(A/C.6/69/SR.20, paras. 15-16); South Africa (ibid., para. 114).
The Netherlands (A/C.6/69/SR.20, paras. 15-17); Ireland (A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 177).
Croatia (A/C.6/69/SR.20, para. 94); Japan (ibid., para. 49).
Croatia (ibid., paras 94-97); Czech Republic (ibid., para. 10).
Chile (A/C.6/69/SR.24, para. 52); Finland (on behalf of the Nordic countries) (A/C.6/69/SR.19,
para. 82); United Kingdom (ibid., para. 159).
Chile (A/C.6/69/SR.24, para. 52); Italy (A/C.6/69/SR.22, para. 53); Mongolia (A/C.6/69/SR.24,
paras 94-95); Romania (A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 147;) Trinidad and Tobago (A/C.6/69/SR.26,
para. 118); United Kingdom (A/C.6/69/SR.19, para. 160).
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C.

Relationship of a convention on crimes against humanity to other
treaties, including the Rome Statute
20. The relationship of a convention on crimes against humanity to other treaties
is an extremely important issue that will guide the Commission in its work. Many of
the acts that fall within the scope of crimes against humanity (when they are done as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population) are
also acts addressed in existing treaty regimes, such as the 1948 Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 26 and the 1984 Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 27
A convention on crimes against humanity should build upon the text and techniques
of relevant existing treaty regimes, but should also avoid any conflicts with those
regimes.
21. In particular, a convention on crimes against humanity should avoid any
conflicts with the Rome Statute. Certainly the drafting of a new convention should
draw upon the language of the Rome Statute, as well as associated instruments and
jurisprudence, whenever appropriate. But the new convention should avoid any
conflicts with the Rome Statute, given the large number of States that have adhered
to it. For example, in the event that a State party to the Rome Statute receives a
request from the International Criminal Court for the surrender of a person to the
Court and also receives a request from another State for extradition of the person
pursuant to the proposed convention, article 90 of the Rome Statute pro vides a
procedure to resolve the competing requests. The draft articles should be crafted to
ensure that States parties to the Rome Statute can follow that procedure even after
joining the convention on crimes against humanity. Moreover, in several ways th e
adoption of a convention could promote desirable objectives not addressed in the
Rome Statute, while simultaneously supporting the mandate of the International
Criminal Court.
22. First, the Rome Statute regulates relations between its States parties and the
International Criminal Court, but does not regulate matters among the parties
themselves (nor among parties and non-parties). In other words, the Rome Statute is
focused on the “vertical” relationship of States to the International Criminal Court,
but not the “horizontal” relationship of inter-State cooperation. Part 9 of the Rome
Statute on “International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance” implicitly
acknowledges that inter-State cooperation on crimes within the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court should continue to operate outside the Rome Statute,
but does not direct itself to the regulation of that cooperation. A convention on
crimes against humanity could expressly address inter-State cooperation on the
investigation, apprehension, prosecution and punishment in national legal systems
of persons who commit crimes against humanity, 28 an objective fully consistent
with the Rome Statute’s object and purpose.
23. Second, the International Criminal Court is focused upon punishment of
persons for the crimes within its jurisdiction, not upon steps that should be taken by

__________________
26
27
28
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Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 1021 (hereinafter Genocide Convention).
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (hereinafter Convention against Torture).
See L. Olson, “Re-enforcing Enforcement in a Specialized Convention on Crimes Against
Humanity: Inter-State Cooperation, Mutual Legal Assistance, and the Aut Dedere Aut Judicare
Obligation,” in L. Sadat (ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity, supra
note 7, p. 323.
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States to prevent such crimes before they happen. As discussed in greater detail in
section V below, a new convention on crimes against humanity could include
obligations relating to prevention that draw upon comparable obligations in other
treaties, such as the Genocide Convention and the Convention against Torture. As
such, a convention on crimes against humanity could clarify a State ’s obligation to
prevent crimes against humanity and provide a basis for holding States accountable
in that regard.
24. Third, while the International Criminal Court is a key international institution
for prosecution of high-level persons who commit these crimes, the Court was not
designed (nor given the resources) to prosecute all persons responsible for crimes
against humanity. Rather, the Court is predicated on the notion that, in the first
instance, national jurisdictions are the proper place for prosecution in the event that
appropriate national laws are in place (the principle of complementarity). 29 Further,
in some circumstances the Court may wish to transfer a suspect in its custody for
prosecution in a national jurisdiction, but may be unable to do so if the national
jurisdiction is not capable of charging the suspect with crimes against humanity. 30
Given that the Court does not have the capacity to prosecute all persons responsible
for crimes against humanity, or to strengthen national legal systems in this regard, a
new convention could help reinforce the Court by developing greater capacity at the
national level for prevention and punishment of such crimes. 31
25. Fourth, and relatedly, a convention on crimes against humanity would require
the enactment of national laws that criminalize crimes against humanity, something
which, as discussed in section II, currently many States have not done, including
many States parties to the Rome Statute. In particular, a convention could require
States to exercise jurisdiction over an offender present in it s territory even when the
offender is a non-national and committed the crime abroad. 32 Upon joining the
convention, States without such laws would be expressly obliged to enact them.
States with such laws would be obliged to review them to determine whether they
encompass the full range of heinous conduct covered by the convention, and allow
for the exercise of jurisdiction over offenders.
__________________
29

30

31

32
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M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law: Origin,
Development and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008); J. Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome
Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (Oxford, 2008).
Such circumstances arose, for example, before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
in the Bagaragaza case. See Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Appeals Chamber, Decision on
Rule 11bis Appeal, Case No. ICTR-05-86-AR11bis, para. 18 (Aug. 30, 2006) (“the Appeals
Chamber cannot sanction the referral of a case to a jurisdiction for trial where the conduct
cannot be charged as a serious violation of international humanitarian law”).
See Statement to the Sixth Committee by Austria, at 5 (Oct. 28, 2013), available at
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703455/austria-part-1.pdf (“The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court certainly cannot be the last step in the endeavor to prosecute such
crimes and to combat impunity. The Court is only able to deal with a few major perpetrators, but
this does not take away the primary responsibility of states to prosecute crimes against
humanity.”).
See P. Akhavan, “The Universal Repression of Crimes against Humanity before National
Jurisdictions: The Need for a Treaty-Based Obligation to Prosecute,” in L. Sadat (ed.), Forging
a Convention for Crimes against Humanity, supra note 7, p. 28, at 31 (noting that “whatever
implicit duty to prosecute may arguably exist [in the Rome Statute] does not extend to universal
jurisdiction” and that, as of 2009, only eleven European Union and eight African Union States
have enacted laws allowing for such jurisdiction with respect to crimes against humanity).
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26. As such, rather than conflict with other treaty regimes, a well -designed
convention on crimes against humanity could help fill a gap 33 in existing treaty
regimes and, in doing so, simultaneously reinforce those regimes.

III. Background to crimes against humanity
A.

Concept of crimes against humanity
27. The concept of “crimes against humanity” is generally seen as having two
broad features. First, the crime is so heinous that it is viewed as an attack on the
very quality of being human. 34 Second, the crime is so heinous that it is an attack
not just upon the immediate victims, but also against all humanity, and he nce the
entire community of humankind has an interest in its punishment. It has been noted:
Whilst rules proscribing war crimes address the criminal conduct of a
perpetrator towards an immediate protected object, rules proscribing crimes
against humanity address the perpetrator ’s conduct not only towards the
immediate victim but also towards the whole of humankind … Because of
their heinousness and magnitude they constitute egregious attacks on human
dignity, on the very notion of humaneness. They conseque ntly affect, or should
affect, each and every member of mankind, whatever his or her nationality,
ethnic group and location. 35
28. As discussed below, the concept “crimes against humanity” has evolved over
the past century, with watershed developments in the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter) and the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Charter), and important refinements in the statutes
and case law of contemporary international criminal tribunals, including the
International Criminal Court. 36 Although the codification and application of the

__________________
33
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See, e.g., Statement to the Sixth Committee by Slovenia, at 7 (Oct. 30, 2013), available at
https://papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/703847/slovenia.pdf (“This legal gap in the
international law has been recognised for some time and is particularly evident in the field of
State cooperation, including mutual legal assistance and extradition. We believe all efforts
should be directed at filling this gap.”)
Hannah Arendt characterized the Holocaust as a “new crime, the crime against humanity — in
the sense of a crime ‘against human status,’ or against the very nature of mankind.” H. Arendt,
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, at 268 (Viking Press, 1965).
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-96-22-A, para. 21
(Oct. 7, 1997) (hereinafter “Erdemović 1997”) (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges McDonald and
Judge Vohrah); see D. Luban, “A Theory of Crimes against Humanity,” Yale J. of Int’l L., vol. 29,
at 85, para. 90 (2004) (“We are creatures whose nature compels us to live socially, but who cannot
do so without artificial political organization that inevitably poses threats to our well -being, and,
at the limit, to our very survival. Crimes against humanity represent th e worst of those threats;
they are the limiting case of politics gone cancerous.”); see also R. Vernon, “What is Crime
against Humanity?”, J. of Pol. Phil., vol. 10, p. 231 (2002); C. Macleod, “Towards a Philosophical
Account of Crimes against Humanity,” European J. of Int’l L., vol. 21, p. 281 (2010).
See generally B. Ricci, Crimes against Humanity: A Historical Perspective (iUniverse, 2004);
O. López Goldaracena, Derecho internacional y crímenes contra la humanidad (Asociación
Americana de Juristas, 2006); P. Parenti (ed.), Los crímenes contra la humanidad y el genocidio
en el derecho internacional: origen y evolución de las figuras, elementos típicos, jurisprudencia
internacional (Ad-Hoc, 2007); M.C. Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution
and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011); N. Geras, Crimes against
Humanity: Birth of a Concept (Manchester University Press, 2011).
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crime has led to some doctrinal divergences, the concept contains several basic
elements that are common across all formulations of the crime. The crime i s an
international crime; it matters not whether the national law of the territory in which
the act was committed has criminalized the conduct. The crime is directed against a
civilian population and hence has a certain scale or systematic nature that gene rally
extends beyond isolated incidents of violence or crimes committed for purely
private purposes. The crime can be committed within the territory of a single State
or can be committed across borders. Finally, the crime concerns the most heinous
acts of violence and persecution known to humankind. A wide range of scholarship
has analysed these various elements. 37
__________________
37
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E. Schwelb, “Crimes against Humanity,” British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 23, p. 181
(1946); J. Dautricourt, “Crime against Humanity: European Views on its Conception and its
Future,” J. of Crim. L. and Criminology, vol. 40, p. 170 (1949); J. Graven, “Les Crimes contre
l’Humanité,” Recueil des Cours, vol. 1950-I, p. 433 (1950); E. Aronéanu, Le Crime Contre
l’Humanité (Dalloz, 1961); P. Ramella, Crímenes contra la humanidad (Ediciones Depalma,
1986); P. Ramella, Crimes contra a humanidade (Forense, 1987); P. Sturma, “Knávrhu kodexu
zlocinu proti míru a bezpecnosti lidstva,” Praìvniìk, vol. 128 (9/10), p. 879 (1989); G. Richard
(ed.), L’Histoire Inhumaine: Massacres et Génocides des Origines à Nos Jours (A. Colin,
1992); M. Delmas-Marty et al., “Le crime contre l’humanité, les droits de l’homme et
l’irréductible humain,” Revue de Science Criminelle et de Droit Pénal Comparé, vol. 11, p. 477
(1994); A. Becker, Der Tatbestand des Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit – Überlegungen
zur Problematik eines völkerrechtlichen Strafrechts (Duncker & Humblot, 1996); Y. Dinstein,
“Crimes against Humanity,” in J. Makarczyk (ed.), Theory of International Law at the Threshold
of the 21 st Century, Essays in Honor of Krzysztof Skubiszewski, p. 891 (Kluwer, 1996);
M. Lippman, “Crimes Against Humanity,” Boston College Third World L. Rev., vol. 17, p. 171
(1997); S. Chalandon & P. Nivelle, Crimes contre l’Humanité: Barbie, Bouvier, Bousquet,
Capon (Plon, 1998); B. Van Schaack, “The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving
the Incoherence,” Columbia J. Transnat’l L., vol. 37, p. 787 (1999); M.C. Bassiouni, Crimes
against Humanity in International Law (Kluwer, 2d ed. 1999); J. Bazelaire & T. Cretin,
La justice internationale, son évolution, son avenir, de Nuremberg à La Haye (Presses
Universitaires de France, 2000); A. Gil Gil, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft,
vol. 112, p. 381 (2000); E. Greppi, I crimini di guerra e contro l’umanità nel diritto
internazionale (UTET, 2001); K. Kittichaisaree, International Criminal Law, p. 85 (2001);
Y. Jurovics, Réflexions sur la spécificité du crime contre l’humanité (LGDJ, 2002);
F. Palombino, “The Overlapping between War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity in
International Criminal Law,” Italian Y.B. Int’l L., vol. 12, p. 123 (2002); A. Cassese, “Crimes
against Humanity,” in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Commentary, p. 375 (Oxford University Press, 2002); M. Lattimer and P. Sands (eds.),
Justice for Crimes against Humanity (Hart Publishing, 2003); G. Manske, Verbrechen gegen die
Menschlichkeit als Verbrechen an der Menschheit (Duncker & Humblot, 2003); A. Romero
Mendoza (ed.), Crímenes de lesa humanidad: un enfoque venezolano (El Nacional, 2004);
S. Meseke, Der Tatbestand der Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit nach dem Römischen
Statut des IStGH (Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2004); K. Ambos, Estudios de derecho
penal internacional, p. 303 (Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 2005); D.L. Shelton (ed.),
Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity (Macmillan Reference, 2005); L. May,
Crimes against Humanity: A Normative Account (Cambridge University Press, 2005);
M Capellà i Roig, La tipificación internacional de los crímenes contra la humanidad (Tirant lo
Blanch, 2005); L. Moir, “Crimes against Humanity in Historical Perspective,” N.Z. Y.B. Int’l L.,
vol. 3, p. 101 (2006); K. Ambos and S. Wirth, “El Derecho Actual sobre Crímenes en Contra de
la Humanidad,” in K. Ambos (ed.), Temas de Derecho Penal Internacional y Europeo, p. 167
(Pons, 2006); R. C. Slye, “Refugee Jurisprudence, Crimes against Humanity, and Customary
International Law,” in A.F. Bayefsky (ed.), Human Rights and Refugees, Internally Displaced
Persons and Migrant Workers (2006); A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, p. 98 (Oxford
University Press, 2nd ed. 2008); M. del Carmen Márquez Carrasco, El proceso de codificación y
desarrollo progresivo de los crímenes contra la humanidad (Universidad de Sevilla,
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B.

Historical emergence of the prohibition of crimes against humanity
29. An important forerunner of the concept of “crimes against humanity” is the
“Martens clause” of the Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War
on Land and the Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
(1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions), the latter of which made reference to the
“laws of humanity and the … dictates of public conscience” when crafting
protections for persons in time of war. 38 That clause is typically understood as
indicating that, until there exists a comprehensive codification of the laws of war,
principles of “humanity” offer residual protection. 39
30. The Hague Conventions addressed conduct occurring in inter-State armed
conflicts, not violence by a Government directed against its own people. In the
aftermath of the First World War, further thought was given to whether international
law regulated atrocities inflicted domestically by a Government. In 1919, a

__________________
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Secretariado de Publicaciones, 2008); C. Eboe-Osuji, “Crimes against Humanity: Directing
Attacks against a Civilian Population,” African J. of Legal Stud., vol. 2, p. 188 (2008);
A. Morlachetti, “Imprescriptibilidad de los Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad,” in H. Romero
Villanueva, La Prescripción Penal, p. 137 (Abeledo Perrot, 2008); M. Delmas-Marty et al.,
Le crime contre l’humanité (Presses Universitaires de France, 2009); J. Doria, “Whether Crimes
against Humanity Are Backdoor War Crimes,” in J. Doria et al. (eds.), The Legal Regime of the
International Criminal Court: Essays in Honor of Professor Igo B lishchenko, p. 645 (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2009); S. Kirsch, Der Begehungszusammenhang der Verbrechen gegen die
Menschlichkeit (Peter Lang, 2009); S. Kirsch, “Two Kinds of Wrong: On the Context Element
of Crimes against Humanity,” Leiden J. of Int’l L., vol. 22, p. 525 (2009); B. Kuschnik, Der
Gesamttatbestand des Verbrechens gegen die Menschlichkeit: Herleitungen, Ausprägungen,
Entwicklungen (Duncker & Humblot, 2009); S. Garibian, Le crime contre l’humanité, au regard
des principes fondateurs de l’Etat moderne (Schulthess Verlag, 2010); E. Amati, “I Crimini
contro l’Umanità,” in E. Amati et al. (eds.), Introduzione al Diritto Penale Internazionale,
p. 411 (Giuffrè, 2d ed. 2010); W. van der Wolf (ed.), Crimes Against Humanity and
International Law (International Courts Association, 2011); L. van den Herik, “Using Custom to
Reconceptualize Crimes Against Humanity,” in S. Darcy and J. Powderly (eds.), Judicial
Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals (2010); M. DeGuzman, “Crimes against
Humanity,” in B. Brown (ed.), Research Handbook on International Criminal Law, p. 62 (Edgar
Elgar Publishing, 2011); G. Acquaviva & F. Pocar, “Crimes against Humanity,” Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. II, p. 855 (2012); J. Dondé Matute, Tipos
Penales en el Ámbito Internacional, p. 97 (Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Penales, 2d ed. 2012);
M. Bettati, “Le crime contre l’humanité,” in H. Ascensio et al. (eds.), Droit international pénal,
p. 103 (Pedone, 2d ed. 2012); H.D. Bosly & D. Vandermeersch, Génocide, crimes contre
l’humanité et crimes de guerre face à la justice (LGDJ, 2012); P.M. Dhena, Droit d’ingérence
humanitaire et normes internationales impératives: Essai sur les crimes de guerre, crimes
contre l’humanité et crime de génocide (l’Harmattan, 2012); C. Focarelli, Diritto
Internazionale, vol. I, p. 485 (CEDAM, 2d ed. 2012); A. Valencia Villa, “Los Crímenes de Lesa
Humanidad: Su Calificación en América Latina y algunos Comentarios en el Caso Colombiano, ”
in H. Olásolo Alonso et al. (coord.), Perspectiva Iberoamericana sobre la Justicia Penal
Internacional, vol. I, p. 119 (Tirant lo Blanch, 2012); L. Sadat, “Crimes Against Humanity in
the Modern Age,” American J. Int’l L., vol. 107, p. 334 (2013).
Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, preamble,
36 Stat. 2277, 187 Consol. T.S. 227. The 1907 version of the clause provides:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted
by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of
the principles of the laws of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.
See T. Meron, “The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public
Conscience,” Am. J. of Int’l L., vol. 94, p. 78 (2000).
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Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of
Penalties presented a report to the post-First World War Paris Peace Conference
which, after referencing the Martens clause, identified various crimes for which
persons might be prosecuted with respect to conduct during the war. 40 The
Commission advocated including atrocities by a Government against its own people
within the scope of what would become the Treaty of Versailles, so that prosecutions
before international and national tribunals would address crimes in violation of both
“the established laws and customs of war” and “the elementary laws of humanity”. 41
The Commission therefore called for the establishment of an international
commission to prosecute senior leaders, with the applicable law being “the principles
of the law of nations as they result from the usages established among civilized
peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience”. 42
31. No “crimes against humanity”, however, were ultimately included in articles
228 and 229 of the Treaty of Versailles; 43 those provisions relate solely to war
crimes. As such, no prosecutions for crimes against humanity occurred rela ting to
the First World War, 44 but the seeds were sown for such prosecutions in the
aftermath of the Second World War. 45 The Charter of the International Military
Tribunal established at Nuremberg, 46 as amended by the Berlin Protocol, 47 included
“crimes against humanity” as a component of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The
Nuremberg Charter defined such crimes in article 6(c) as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
__________________
40
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Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the
Responsibilities of the Authors of War and on Enforcement of Penalties (Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Division of International Law Pamphlet No. 32, 1919), partially
reprinted in Am. J. of Int’l L., vol. 14, p. 95 (1920).
Ibid., at 115.
Ibid., at 122; see M.C. Bassiouni, “World War I: ‘The War to End All Wars’ and the Birth of a
Handicapped International Criminal Justice System,” Denver J. of Int’l L. & Policy, vol. 30,
p. 244 (2002).
Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers of Germany, Arts. 228-29, June 28,
1919, 225 C.T.S. 188, 285, 2 Bevans 43, at 136-37.
The Treaty of Peace between the Allies and Turkey, American J. of Int’l L., vol. 15, p. 179, at
235 (Supp. 1921), included a provision on prosecution for “crimes against humanity,” but that
treaty never entered into force.
See R. Clark, “History of Efforts to Codify Crimes Against Humanity,” in L. Sadat (ed.),
Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity, supra note 7, p. 8. On the role of
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in developing crimes against humanity as one of the headings for
prosecutions at Nürnberg, see E. Lauterpacht, The Life of Hersch Lauterpacht, p. 272
(Cambridge University Press, 2010) and the review by S. Schwebel at British Yearbook
International Law, vol. 83, p. 143 (2013).
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, Annex, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S.
280 (hereinafter Nürnberg Charter).
Protocol Rectifying Discrepancy in Text of Charter, October 6, 1945, published in Trial of the
Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, vol. 1 (Nürnberg 1947). The
Berlin Protocol replaced a semi-colon after “during the war” with a comma, so as to harmonize
the English and French texts with the Russian text. The effect of doing so was to link the first
part of the provision to the latter part of the provision (“in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal”), and hence to the existence of an international armed conflict.
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32. This definition of crimes against humanity was linked to the existence of an
international armed conflict; the acts only constituted crimes under international law
if committed in execution of or in connection with “any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal”, meaning a crime against peace or a war crime. As
such, the justification for intruding into matters that traditionally were within the
national jurisdiction of a State was based on the crime’s connection to inter-State
conflict. That connection, in turn, suggested heinous crimes occurring on a largescale, perhaps as part of a pattern of conduct. 48 The International Military Tribunal,
charged with trying the senior political and military leaders of the Third Reich,
convicted several defendants for crimes against humanity committed during the
war, 49 though in some instances the connection of those crimes with other crimes in
the Tribunal’s jurisdiction was tenuous. 50
33. After the first trial of senior German leaders, 51 further individuals were
convicted of crimes against humanity during the trials conducted by the occupation
authorities pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10. 52 For example, crimes against
humanity played a part in all 12 of the subsequent trials conducted by occupation
authorities of the United States of America. 53 Control Council Law No. 10 did not
expressly provide that crimes against humanity must be connected with a crime
against peace or a war crime; while some of the trials maintained that connection,
__________________
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See United Nations War Crimes Commission, History of the United Nations War Crimes
Commission and the Development of the Laws of War, p. 179 (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office,
1948) (“Only crimes which either by their magnitude and savagery or by their large number or
by the fact that a similar pattern was applied at different times and places, endangered the
international community or shocked the conscience of mankind, warranted intervention by
States other than that on whose territory the crimes had been committed, or whose subjects had
become their victims.”).
See R. Clark, “Crimes against Humanity at Nuremberg,” in G. Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev
(eds.), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, p. 177 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990);
L. Mansfield, “Crimes against Humanity: Reflections on the Fiftieth Anniversary of Nuremberg
and a Forgotten Legacy,” Nordic J. Int’l L., vol. 64, p. 293 (1995).
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-95-16-T,
para. 576 (Jan. 24, 2000) (noting the tenuous link between the crimes against humanity
committed by Baldur von Schirach and the other crimes within the IMT ’s jurisdiction)
(hereinafter “Kupreškić 2000”).
Crimes against humanity were also within the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Tribunal. See Charter of
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 5(c), Jan. 19, 1946, 4 Bevans 20, at 20
(amended Apr. 26, 1946) (hereinafter Tokyo Charter). No persons, however, were convicted of
this crime by that tribunal; rather, the convictions concerned war crimes against persons other
than Japanese nationals that occurred outside Japan. See N. Boister & R. Cryer, The Tokyo
International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal, at 32, 194, 328-30 (Oxford University Press,
2008).
Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against
Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, in Official Gazette Control Council for Germany,
vol. 3, p. 50 (1946). Control Council Law No. 10 recognized crimes against humanity as:
“Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation
of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated.” Ibid., art. II(1)(c).
T. Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials Under
Control Council Law No. 10, at 69, 92, 118-19 (1949); see J. Brand, “Crimes against Humanity
and the Nürnberg Trials,” Oregon L. Rev., vol. 28, p. 93 (1949); J. Heller, The Nuremberg
Military Tribunals and the Origins of International Criminal Law , p. 85 (Oxford University
Press, 2011).
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others did not. 54 The Justice Case did not maintain the connection, but did
determine that crimes against humanity entail more than isolated cases of atrocity or
persecution and require “proof of conscious participation in systematic government
organized or approved procedures”. 55 German national courts also applied Control
Council Law No. 10 in hundreds of cases and in doing so did not require a
connection with war crimes or crimes against peace. 56
34. The principles of international law recognized in the Nuremberg Charter were
noted and reaffirmed in 1945-1946 by the General Assembly, 57 which also directed
the International Law Commission to “formulate” those principles and to prepare a
draft code of offences. 58 The Commission then studied and distilled these principles
in 1950 as the “Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal”, which defined crimes
against humanity in Principle VI(c) as: “Murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done or
such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection with any crime
against peace or any war crime”. 59 In its commentary to this principle, the
Commission emphasized that the crime need not be committed during a war, but
maintained that pre-war crimes must nevertheless be in connection with a crime
against peace. 60 At the same time, the Commission maintained that “acts may be
crimes against humanity even if they are committed by the perpetrator against his
own population”. 61
35. Although the Commission’s 1950 Nuremberg Principles continued to require a
connection between crimes against humanity and war crimes or crimes against the
peace, that connection was omitted in the Commission’s 1954 draft Code of
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind. That draft code identified as
one of the offences against the peace and security of mankind: “Inhuman acts such
as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or persecutions, committed
against any civilian population on social, political, racial, religious or cultural
grounds by the authorities of a State or by private individuals acting at the
instigation or with the toleration of such authorities”. 62 When explaining the final
clause of that offence, the Commission said that:
__________________
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See, e.g., United States of America v. Flick et al., 3 L.R.T.W.C. 1212–14 (1952).
See, e.g., United States of America v. Altstoetter et al. (“Justice Case”), 3 L.R.T.W.C. 974, 982
(1951).
See U. Vultejus, “Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit,” Strafverteidiger, vol. 12, p. 602 (1992).
See Extradition and Punishment of War Criminals, G.A. Res. 3(I), at 9-10 (Feb. 13, 1946);
Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nürnberg
Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (Dec. 11, 1946).
G.A. Res. 177(II) (Nov. 21, 1947).
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the
Judgment of the Tribunal, with Commentaries, Report of the International Law Commission on
the Work of its Second Session, U.N. GAOR, 5 th Sess., Supp. No. 12, principle 6(c), U.N. Doc.
A/1316 (1950), reprinted in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2, p. 374 (1950).
Ibid., para. 123.
Ibid., para. 124.
Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind, with Commentaries, Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess.,
Supp. No. 9, ch. 3, art. 2(11), U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954); see D. Johnson, “The Draft Code of
Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind,” International and Comparative Law,
vol. 4, p. 445 (1955).
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in order not to characterize any inhuman act committed by a private individual
as an international crime, it was found necessary to provide that such an act
constitutes an international crime only if committed by the private individual
at the instigation or with the toleration of the authorities of a State. 63
36. There was hope that in the 1950s it would be possible to establish a permanent
international criminal court, but the General Assembly deferred action on the
Commission’s 1954 draft code of offences, indicating that first the crime of
aggression should be defined. 64 Some attention then focused on developing national
laws with respect to the crime. In that regard, the 1968 Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against
Humanity called upon States to criminalize nationally “crimes against humanity”
and to set aside statutory limitations on prosecuting the crime. 65 As the first
definition of crimes against humanity in a multilateral convention drafted and
adhered to by several States, it bears noting that article 1(b) referred to “[c]rimes
against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time of peace as they are
defined in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, of
8 August 1945 and confirmed by resolutions 3 (I) of 13 February 1946 and 95 (I) of
11 December 1946 of the General Assembly of the United Nations ….”
37. Consisting of just four substantive articles, the 1968 Convention is narrowly
focused on statutory limitations; while it does call upon States parties to take steps
“with a view to making possible” extradition for the crime, the convention does not
expressly obligate a party to exercise jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. As
at January 2015, the convention has attracted adherence by 55 States.
38. In 1981, the General Assembly invited the Commission to resume its work on
the draft code of offences. 66 In 1991, the Commission completed on first reading a
draft code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind. 67 The Assembly
then invited the Commission, within the framework of the draft code, to consider
further the question of establishing an international criminal juri sdiction to address
such crimes, including proposals for a permanent international criminal court. 68
Completion of the project became especially pertinent after the establishment of the
ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and R wanda
(discussed below), and the emergence of greater support for a permanent
international criminal court. In 1996, the Commission completed a second reading

__________________
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Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. 2, p. 150 (1954).
G.A. Res. 898 (IX) (Dec. 14, 1954); G.A. Res. 1187 (XII) (Dec. 11, 1957).
Nov. 26, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73; see R. Miller, “The Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, ” American J. of Int’l L.,
vol. 65, p. 476 (1971). For a regional convention of a similar nature, see European Convention
on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes,
Jan. 25, 1974, E.T.S. No. 82. As of January 2015, there are seven States Parties to this
Convention.
G.A. Res. 36/106 (Dec. 10, 1981).
Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc.
A/46/10, at 265 (1991) (hereinafter 1991 ILC Report). The 1991 draft Code contained twentysix categories of crimes.
G.A. Res. 46/54 (Dec. 9, 1991).
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of the draft code of crimes. 69 The 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and
Security of Mankind listed in article 18 a series of acts that constituted crimes
against humanity “when committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and
instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group ”. 70 In
explaining that opening clause, the Commission commented:
(3) The opening clause of this definition establishes the two general
conditions which must be met for one of the prohibited acts to qualify as a
crime against humanity covered by the Code. The first condition requires that
the act was “committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale”. This first
condition consists of two alternative requirements. The first alternative
requires that the inhumane acts be “committed in a systematic manner”
meaning pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy. The implementation of this
plan or policy could result in the repeated or continuous commission of
inhumane acts. The thrust of this requirement is to exclude a random act which
was not committed as part of a broader plan or policy. The Cha rter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal did not include such a requirement. Nonetheless the
Nuremberg Tribunal emphasized that the inhumane acts were committed as
part of the policy of terror and were “in many cases … organized and
systematic” in considering whether such acts constituted crimes against
humanity.
(4) The second alternative requires that the inhumane acts be
committed “on a large scale” meaning that the acts are directed against a
multiplicity of victims. This requirement excludes an isolated inhuma ne act
committed by a perpetrator acting on his own initiative and directed against a
single victim. The Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal did not include this
second requirement either. Nonetheless the Nuremberg Tribunal further
emphasized that the policy of terror was “certainly carried out on a vast scale”
in its consideration of inhumane acts as possible crimes against humanity. The
term “mass scale” was used in the text of the draft code as adopted on first
reading to indicate the requirement of a multiplicity of victims. This term was
replaced by the term “large scale” which is sufficiently broad to cover various
situations involving a multiplicity of victims, for example, as a result of the
cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the singula r effect of an
inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude. The first condition is formulated in
terms of the two alternative requirements. Consequently, an act could
constitute a crime against humanity if either of these conditions is met.
(5) The second condition requires that the act was “instigated or
directed by a Government or by any organization or group ”. The necessary
instigation or direction may come from a Government or from an organization
or a group. This alternative is intended to exclude the situation in which an
individual commits an inhumane act while acting on his own initiative
__________________
69

70

15-02139

Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the International
Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth session, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1996, vol. II (Part Two), at 17 (1996). The 1996 draft Code contained f ive
categories of crimes. See E. Vargas Carreño, “El Proyecto de Código de Crímenes contra la Paz
y la Seguridad de la Humanidad de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional, ” in Liber Amicorum:
Héctor Fix Zamudio, vol. II, p. 1523 (Secretaría de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos
Humanos, 1998).
Ibid., at 47.
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pursuant to his own criminal plan in the absence of any encouragement or
direction from either a Government or a group or organization. This type of
isolated criminal conduct on the part of a single individual would not
constitute a crime against humanity. It would be extremely difficult for a
single individual acting alone to commit the inhumane acts as envisaged in
article 18. The instigation or direction of a Govern ment or any organization or
group, which may or may not be affiliated with a Government, gives the act its
great dimension and makes it a crime against humanity imputable to private
persons or agents of a State.
(6) The definition of crimes against humanity contained in article 18
does not include the requirement that an act was committed in time of war or
in connection with crimes against peace or war crimes as in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal. The autonomy of crimes against humanity was
recognized in subsequent legal instruments which did not include this
requirement. … The absence of any requirement of an international armed
conflict as a prerequisite for crimes against humanity was also confirmed by
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: ‘It is by now a settled
rule of customary international law that crimes against humanity do not
require a connection to international armed conflict. ’71
39. Since 1996, the Commission on occasion has addressed crimes against
humanity. In 2001 the Commission indicated that the prohibition of crimes against
humanity was “clearly accepted and recognized” as a peremptory norm of
international law. 72 The International Court of Justice has also indicated that the
prohibition on certain acts, such as State-sponsored torture, has the character of jus
cogens, 73 which a fortiori suggests that a prohibition of the perpetration of that act
on a widespread or systematic basis would also have the character of jus cogens.

__________________
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Ibid., at 47-48 (footnotes omitted).
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary on Article 26, para. 5, in Official Records of
the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, p. 283 (2001) (maintaining that
those “peremptory norms that are clearly accepted and recognized include the prohibition
of … crimes against humanity”); see also Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law , Report of the Study Group
of the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, para. 374 (Apr. 13, 2006), as
corrected by U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682/Corr.1 (Aug. 11, 2006) (finalized by Martti Koskenniemi)
(identifying crimes against humanity as one of the “most frequently cited candidates for the
status of jus cogens”); see also Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece
intervening), I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 99, at para. 95 (indicating that the crimes against humanity
at issue in the Arrest Warrant case “undoubtedly possess the character of jus cogens”); Case of
Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Series C No. 154, para. 96 (Sept. 26, 2006) (acknowledging the
jus cogens status of crimes against humanity).
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), I.C.J.
Reports 2012, p. 422, at para. 99; see also Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Trial Chamber, Judgment,
ICTY Case No. IT-95-17/1, para. 153 (1998); Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, E.Ct.H.R.,
Judgment, App. No. 35763/97, para. 61 (2001).
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C.

Crimes against humanity before contemporary international and
special courts and tribunals
40. By its resolution 827 (1993), the Security Council established the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 (International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) and
adopted the statute of the Tribunal. Article 5 of the statute includes “crimes against
humanity” as part of the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia. 74 That article reads:
Article 5
Crimes against humanity
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict,
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian
population:
(a)

murder;

(b)

extermination;

(c)

enslavement;

(d)

deportation;

(e)

imprisonment;

(f)

torture;

(g)

rape;

(h)

persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;

(i)

other inhumane acts.

Although the Secretary-General’s report proposing this article indicated that crimes
against humanity “refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature … committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on
national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds, ” 75 that particular language
was not included in the text of article 5. The formulation used in article 5 retained a
connection to armed conflict by criminalizing specified acts “when committed in
armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against
any civilian population.” This formulation is best understood contextually, having
been developed in 1993 with an understanding that armed conflict in f act existed in
the former Yugoslavia (which had led to the exercise of the Council ’s Chapter VII
enforcement powers), and as designed principally to dispel the notion that crimes
against humanity had to be linked to an international armed conflict. To the extent
that this formulation might be read to suggest that customary international law
requires a nexus to armed conflict, the Appeals Chamber of the Tribunal later
clarified that there was “no logical or legal basis” for retaining a connection to
__________________
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Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ( S/25704, annex), at art. 5.
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808,
U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 13, para. 48 (May 3, 1993).
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armed conflict, since “it has been abandoned” in State practice since Nuremberg.
The Appeals Chamber also noted that the “obsolescence of the nexus requirement is
evidenced by international conventions regarding genocide and apartheid, both of
which prohibit particular types of crimes against humanity regardless of any
connection to armed conflict”. 76 Indeed, the Appeals Chamber later maintained that
such a connection in the Statute of the Tribunal was simply circumscribing the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal, not codifying customary international
law. 77 Through its jurisprudence, the Tribunal also developed important guidance as
to what elements must be proven when prosecuting an individual for crimes against
humanity. 78 Thereafter, a large number of defendants before the Tribunal were
convicted of crimes against humanity. 79
41. By its resolution 955 (1994), the Security Council established the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide And Other
Such Violations Committed in the Territory Of Neighbouring States between
1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda) and adopted the statute of the Tribunal. Article 3 of the statute includes
“crimes against humanity” as part of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda. 80 Although article 3 retained the same list of conduct (murder,
extermination, etc.), the chapeau language did not retain the reference to armed
conflict, and instead introduced the formulation from the 1993 report of the
Secretary-General (S/25704, para. 48) of “crimes when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national,
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”. As such, the statute expressly provided
that a discriminatory motive was required in order to establish the crime. Like that
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda further developed the key elements that

__________________
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Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 140 (Oct. 2, 1995) (hereinafter “Tadić 1995”).
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-A, paras.
249-51 (July 15, 1999) (hereinafter Tadić 1999) (“The armed conflict requirement is satisfied by
proof that there was an armed conflict; that is all that the Statute requires, and in so doing, it
requires more than does customary international law”); see also Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez,
Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, para. 33 (Feb. 26, 2001) (hereinafter
Kordić 2001).
See, e.g., Tadić 1999, paras. 227-29.
See, e.g., M.C. Roberge, “Jurisdiction of the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda over Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide,” International Review of the Red Cross,
vol. 321, p. 651 (1997); G. Mettraux, “Crimes against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda,” Harvard Int’l L. J.,
vol. 43, p. 237 (2002); S. Meseke, “La contribution de la jurisprudence des tribunaux pénaux
internationaux pour l’ex-Yougoslavie et le Rwanda à la concrétisation de l’incrimination du
crime contre l’humanité,” in M. Chiavario (ed.), La justice pénale internationale entre passé et
avenir, p. 173 (2003); Sadat, supra note 37, at 342-46.
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955,
Annex at art. 3 (Nov. 8, 1994); see generally L.J. van den Herik, The Contribution of the
Rwanda Tribunal to the Development of International Law (Brill, 2005).
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must be proven when prosecuting an individual for crimes against humanity. 81 Here,
too, defendants before the Tribunal were regularly convicted of crimes aga inst
humanity. 82
42. Also in 1994, the Commission completed a draft statute for a permanent
international criminal court, which included in article 20(d) crimes against humanity
as part of the jurisdiction of the proposed court. In its commentary on that
provision, the Commission noted:
It is the understanding of the Commission that the definition of crimes
against humanity encompasses inhumane acts of a very serious character
involving widespread or systematic violations aimed at the civilian population
in whole or in part. The hallmarks of such crimes lie in their large -scale and
systematic nature. The particular forms of unlawful act (murder, enslavement,
deportation, torture, rape, imprisonment, etc.) are less crucial to the definition
than the factors of scale and deliberate policy, as well as in their being targeted
against the civilian population in whole or in part. This idea is sought to be
reflected in the phrase “directed against any civilian population” in article 5 of
the statute of the [International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia], but it is
more explicitly brought out in article [18] 83 of the draft code. The term
“directed against any civilian population” should be taken to refer to acts
committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. The
particular acts referred to in the definition are acts deliberately committed as
part of such an attack. 84
43. Thereafter, the General Assembly decided to establish an ad hoc committee to
review the major substantive and administrative issues arising out of the draft
statute prepared by the Commission and to consider arrangements for the convening
of an international conference of plenipotentiaries. 85 That led, in turn, to the
establishment of a preparatory committee to discuss further the major issues arising
out of the draft statute prepared by the Commission, with a view to preparing a
widely acceptable consolidated text, 86 which was then considered and revised
__________________
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See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, paras. 578-98
(Sept. 2, 1998) (hereinafter Akayesu 1998); see also van den Herik, supra note 80, at 160-96;
R. Kolb, “The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Criminal Tribunals on their
Jurisdiction and on International Crimes,” British Yearbook of Int’l L., vol. 71 (2000), pp. 259,
291-300; R. Kolb, “The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Criminal Tribunals on their
Jurisdiction and on International Crimes (2000-2004),” British Yearbook of Int’l L., vol. 75
(2004), pp. 269, 310-326; R. Kolb, “The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Criminal
Tribunals on their Jurisdiction and on International Crimes (2004-2013),” British Yearbook of
Int’l L., vol. 84 (2014), p. 131 at 163-72.
See, e.g., Akayesu 1998, para. 23; see also van den Herik, supra note 80, at 151-98, 270-73;
G. Mettraux & J. Cerone, “The Jurisprudential Contributions of the ICTR to the Legal
Definition of Crimes against Humanity — The Evolution of the Nexus Requirement,” New
England J. of Int’l and Comp. L., vol. 14, p. 191 (2008); Sadat, supra note 37, at 346-49.
At the time of this commentary, the relevant article in the draft Code was Article 21, as adopted
at first reading, and subsequently renumbered to be Article 18 at second reading.
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N.
GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, at 40 (1994).
G.A. Res. 49/53 (Dec. 9, 1994).
G.A. Res. 50/46 (Dec. 11, 1995).
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further at a diplomatic conference. 87 That conference led to the adoption in Rome
on 17 July 1998 of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. 88
As at January 2015, 122 States are parties to the Rome Statute.
44. Article 5(1)(b) of the Rome Statute includes crimes against humanity within the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. 89 Article 7(1) defines the crime as a
series of acts “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack ”. 90 Article 7(2) further
clarifies that such an attack “means a course of conduct involving the multiple
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population,
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
acts”. 91 Article 7, which is addressed in greater detail in section VI below, does not
retain the nexus to an armed conflict that characterized the statute of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, nor the discriminatory motive
requirement that characterized the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (except with respect to acts of persecution).
45. In preparation for the entry into force of the Rome Statute, States developed
the document entitled Elements of Crimes, which sets forth important guidance as to
what must be proven when prosecuting an individual for crimes against humanity. 92
__________________
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G.A. Res. 51/207 (Dec. 17, 1996).
Rome Statute, supra note 5.
Ibid., art. 5(b).
Ibid., art. 7(1). For discussion of the new phrase “with knowledge of the attack,” see infra
Part VI(D). For general commentary on the adoption of Article 7, see P. Hwang, “Defining
Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ” Fordham
Int’l L. J., vol. 22, p. 457, at 497-501 (1998); D. Robinson, “Defining ‘Crimes against
Humanity’ at the Rome Conference,” American J. of Int’l L., vol. 93, p. 43 (1999); H. von
Hebel, “Crimes Against Humanity under the Rome Statute,” in P. van Krieken (ed.), Refugee
Law in Context: The Exclusion Clause, p. 105 (T.M.C. Asser Press, 1999); D. Cattin, “A General
Definition of Crimes against Humanity under International Law, ” Revue de Droit Penal et des
Droits de l’Homme, vol. 8, p. 83 (1999); H. von Hebel and D. Robinson, “Crimes within the
Jurisdiction of the Court,” in R. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the
Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, p. 79 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999); R. Clark,
“Crimes against Humanity and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ” in
R. Clark et al. (eds.), International and National Law in Russia and Eastern Europe: Essays
in Honor of George Ginsburgs, p. 139 (Kluwer Law International, 2001); D. Robinson, “The
Elements of Crimes against Humanity,” in R. Lee et al. (eds.), The International Criminal
Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, p. 57 (Transnational
Publishers, Ardsley, 2001); A. Gil Gil, “Los Crímenes contra la Humanidad y el Genocidio en el
Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional a la luz de ‘los Elementos de los Crímenes,’” in
K. Ambos (coord.), La Nueva Justicia Penal Supranacional: Desarrollos Post-Roma, at 65,
68-94, 104 (Tirant lo Blanch, 2002); T. McCormack, “Crimes Against Humanity,” in D.
McGoldrick, et al. (eds.), The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy
Issues, p. 179 (Hart Publishing, 2004); P. Currat, Les crimes contre l’humanité dans le Statut de
la Cour pénale internationale (Schulthess, 2006); C.K. Hall et al., “Article 7, Crimes against
Humanity,” in O. Triffterer & K. Ambos (eds.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, p. 159 (Hart Publishing,
2d ed. 2008); W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome
Statute, at 137-87 (Oxford University Press, 2010); Sadat, supra note 37, at 350-55.
Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 7(2).
See International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000)
(hereinafter ICC, Elements of Crimes). Article 9(1) of the Rome Statute provides that Elements
of Crimes “shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of [article 7] ”. See
generally S. Chesterman, “An Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes
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Since the entry into force of the Rome Statute in July 2002, several defendants have
been indicted and some convicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes
against humanity. 93 For example, in March 2014, the Court’s Trial Chamber II
issued its judgment that Germain Katanga had committed, through other persons,
murder as a crime against humanity during an attack in February 2003 on the village
of Bogoro in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 94
46. Crimes against humanity have also featured in the jurisdiction of “hybrid”
tribunals that contain a mixture of international law and national law elements. The
agreement between Sierra Leone and the United Nations which established the
Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2002 includes crimes against humani ty as a part of
the Special Court’s jurisdiction. 95 Article 2 of the Court’s statute provides that the
“Special Court shall have the power to prosecute persons who committed the
following crimes as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civil ian
population”, and then lists nine categories of acts. Several defendants have been
indicted and some convicted by the Special Court for crimes against humanity,
including the former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor. 96
47. By contrast, the statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon does not include
crimes against humanity within the scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which
was established in 2007 by the Security Council and charged with applying
Lebanese law rather than international law. 97 The Secretary-General considered that
the pattern of terrorist attacks at issue for that tribunal “could meet the prima facie
definition of the crime, as developed in the jurisprudence of international criminal
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against Humanity,” Duke J. of Comp. and Int’l L., vol. 10, p. 307 (2000); R. Lee et al. (eds.),
The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(2001); M. Badar, “From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the Elements of
Crimes against Humanity,” San Diego Int’l L. J., vol. 5, p. 73 (2004). Consistent with article 7,
the two elements that must exist to establish a crime against humanity, in conjunction with the
various proscribed acts, are: (1) the conduct was committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population; and (2) the perpetrator knew that the
conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population. The Elements of Crimes have been amended to take account of
further elements adopted at the 2010 ICC Review Conference. See Elements of Crimes,
ICC-PIDS-LT-03-002/11_Eng (2011).
Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Trial Chamber I, Judgment, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 (Mar. 14,
2012); Prosecutor v. Katanga, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, ICC-01/04-01/07 (Mar. 7, 2014)
(hereinafter “Katanga 2014”); Sadat, supra note 37, at 355-68.
Katanga 2014, 1691. Since all appeals have been discontinued, this judgment is final.
Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Sierra Leon e-U.N., art. 2,
Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Taylor, Trial Chamber II, Judgment, SCSL-03-01-T (May 18, 2012);
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, SCSL-03-01-PT (Sept. 26, 2013); see also
Prosecutor v. Fofana and Kondewa, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, SCSL-04-14-A (May 28,
2008); Proseutor v. Brima et al., Appeals Chamber, Judgment, SCSL-04-16-A (Feb. 22, 2008);
see generally W. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, at 40 (Cambridge University Press, 2006); C. C. Jalloh & S.
Meisenberg (eds.), The Law Reports of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2012) (2 vols.); R.W.F. van der Wolf (ed.), The Case Against Charles Taylor (2013);
Sadat, supra note 37, at 349-50.
S.C. Res. 1757 (May 30, 2007).
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tribunals”. 98 However, there was insufficient support within the Security Council
for including crimes against humanity in the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. 99
48. Special courts have been set up within a few national legal systems (at times
with international judges participating) and some of these courts have exercised
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. The Special Panels for Serious Crimes,
established in 2000, had jurisdiction over crimes against humanity committed
between 1 January and 25 October 1999 in East Timor. The relevant language was
an almost verbatim repetition of article 7 of the Rome Statute 100 and the Special
Panels convicted several defendants. 101 Likewise, the Extraordinary Chambers in
__________________
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100
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Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
U.N. Doc. S/2006/893, at 6, para. 24 (Nov. 15, 2006).
See ibid., para. 25; Statement by Mr. Nicholas Michel, Under-Secretary-General for Legal
Affairs, U.N. Doc. S/2006/893/Add.1, at 2 (Nov. 21, 2006) (“The text of the statute, the language
of the report, the preparatory work and the background of the negotiations clearly demonstrate
that the tribunal will not be competent to qualify the attacks as crimes against humanity. ”).
See U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor Regulation 2000/15, On the Establishment
of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, § 5, UNTAET/REG/2000/15
(2000); see also K. Ambos & S. Wirth, “The Current Law of Crimes against Humanity: An
Analysis of UNTAET Regulation 15/2000,” Criminal Law Forum, vol. 13, p. 1, at 2 (2002).
Prosecutor v. Marques et al., East Timor Special Panel for the Trial of Serious Crimes,
Judgment, Case No. 9/2000 (Dec. 11, 2001); Deputy Prosecutor General v. Pedro, ibid.,
Judgment, Case No. 1/2001 (Apr. 14, 2005); Prosecutor v. Leite, ibid., Judgment, Case
No. 04b/2001 (Dec. 7, 2002); Prosecutor v. Cardoso, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 04c/2001,
(Apr. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Carvalho, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 10/2001 (Mar. 18, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Martins et al., ibid., Judgment, Case No. 11/2001 (Nov. 13, 2003); Prosecutor v.
Santos, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 16/2001 (Sept. 9, 2002); Prosecutor v. Sarmento et al., ibid.,
Judgment, Case No. 18./2001 (July 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Sarmento, ibid., Judgment, Case
No. 18a/2001 (Aug. 12, 2003); Prosecutor v. Mendonça, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 18b/2001
(Oct. 13, 2003); Prosecutor v. Correia, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 19/2001 (Mar. 29, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Tacaqui, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 20/2001 (Dec. 9, 2004); Prosecutor v. Soares,
ibid., Judgment, Case No. 02/2002-B (Dec. 1, 2004); Prosecutor v. Ena et al., ibid., Judgment,
Case No. 5/2002 (Mar. 23, 2004); Prosecutor v. Soares, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 7a/2002
(Dec. 9, 2003); Prosecutor v. Olivera et al., ibid., Judgment, Case No. 12/2002 (Feb. 23, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Da Costa Nunes, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 1/2003 (Dec. 10, 2003); Prosecutor v.
Atolan, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 3/2003 (June 9, 2003); Prosecutor v. Cloe et al., ibid.,
Judgment, Case No. 4/2003 (Nov. 16, 2004); Prosecutor v. Sufa, ibid., Judgment, Case
No. 4a/2003 (Nov. 25, 2004); Prosecutor v. Beno, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 4b/2003 (Nov. 16,
2004); Prosecutor v. Metan, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 4c/2003 (Nov. 16, 2004); Prosecutor v.
Gusmão, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 7/2003 (Feb. 28, 2003); Prosecutor v. Mau, ibid., Judgment,
Case No. 8/2003 (Feb. 23, 2004); Prosecutor v. Lao, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 10/2003 (Dec. 3,
2004); Prosecutor v. Soares, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 11/2003 (Dec. 11, 2003); Prosecutor v.
Ludji et al., ibid., Judgment, Case No. 16/2003 (May 19, 2004); Prosecutor v. Guterres, ibid.,
Judgment, Case No. 18a/2003 (Feb. 28, 2005); Prosecutor v. Da Costa et al., ibid., Judgment,
Case No. 22/2003 (Apr. 25, 2005,); Prosecutor v. Maubere, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 23/2003
(July 5, 2004); Prosecutor v. Fernandes, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 25/2003 (Apr. 19, 2005);
Prosecutor v. Correia, ibid., Judgment, Case No. 27/2003 (Apr. 25, 2005); Prosecutor
v. Mesquita et al., ibid., Judgment, Case No. 28/2003 (Dec. 6, 2004); Prosecutor v. Perreira,
ibid., Judgment, Case No. 34/2003 (Apr. 27, 2005); Prosecutor v. De Deus, ibid., Judgment,
Case No. 2a/2004 (Apr. 12, 2005); see also Report to the Secretary-General of the Commission
of Experts to review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human Rights in Timor-Leste (the
then East Timor) in 1999 (May 26, 2005), U.N. Doc. S/2005/458, Annex II (July 15, 2005);
C. Reiger & M. Wierda, The Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste: In Retrospect
(International Center for Transitional Justice, 2006).
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the Courts of Cambodia, established by Cambodia in 2001 102 and the subject of a
Cambodia-United Nations agreement in 2003, 103 included within article 5 of their
statute “the power to bring to trial all Suspects who committed crimes against
humanity”, which the Court has done. 104 The Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal,
established in 2003 by the Iraqi Governing Council, also had within its jurisdiction
crimes against humanity. 105 Again, unlike the Nuremberg Charter, the crime as
formulated for these tribunals requires no link to armed conflict. 106
49. The Extraordinary African Chambers within the Senegalese judicial system,
established in 2012-2013 pursuant to agreements between Senegal and the African
Union, are empowered to try persons “responsible for the crimes and serious
violations of international law, international humanitarian law and custom, and
international conventions ratified by Chad and Senegal, that were committed in
Chad between 7 June 1982 and 1 December 1990”. 107 Article 4(b) of the statute of
the Chambers provides that they have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity,
which are then defined in article 6 in terms that draw upon, but do not replicate,
article 7 of the Rome Statute.
50. Finally, crimes against humanity have also featured at times in the
jurisprudence of regional human rights courts and tribunals, 108 such as before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 109 and the European Court of Human
Rights. The Grand Chamber of the European Court, for example, in 2008 analysed
the meaning of “crimes against humanity” as the concept existed in 1956, finding
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See G.A. Res. 57/228B (May 13, 2003).
Agreement Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During
the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Cambodia-U.N., June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117.
Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, Trial Chamber, Judgment, No. 001/18-072007/ECCC/TC (July 26, 2010) (hereinafter Duch Trial Chamber Judgment); Prosecutor
v. Nuon Chea et al., Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, Closing Order, No. 002/19-09-2007ECCC-OCIJ (Sept. 15, 2010).
Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, art. 10(b), Dec. 10, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 231 (2004). The Iraqi
Interim Government enacted a new statute in 2005, built upon the earlier statut e, which changed
the tribunal’s name to “Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal.” See Law of the Supreme Iraqi
Criminal Tribunal, Law No. 10, Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq (Oct. 18, 2005); see
also M. Scharf, “The Iraqi High Tribunal: A Viable Experiment in International Justice?,” J. of
Int’l Crim. Just., vol. 5, p. 258 (2007); B. Kuschnik, “The Legal Findings of Crimes against
Humanity in the Al-Dujail Judgments of the Iraqi High Tribunal: A Forerunner for the ICC?, ”
Chinese J. of Int’l L., vol. 7, p. 459 (2008); E. van Heugten & P.A. van Laar (eds.), The Iraqi
Special Tribunal for Crimes against Humanity: The Dujail Case (International Courts
Association, 2011).
See, e.g., Duch Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 104, para. 291 (“The notion of armed
conflict also does not form part of the current-day customary definition of crimes against
humanity.”).
Agreement on the Establishment of the Extraordinary African Chambers within the Senegalese
Judicial System, Senegal-African Union, Aug. 22, 2012, 52 I.L.M. 1024 (2013); Agreement on
the Statute of the Chambers, Senegal-African Union, Jan. 30, 2013, 52 I.L.M. 1028.
See A. Huneeus, “International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal Jurisdiction
of the Human Rights Bodies,” Am. J. Int’l L., vol. 107, p. 1 (2013).
See, e.g., J. Dondé Matute, “Los Elementos Contextuales de los Crímenes de Lesa Humanidad y
la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos,” in K. Ambos et al. (eds.), Sistema
Interamericano de Protección de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Penal Internacional, Tomo II,
p. 205 (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011).
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that even by that point the nexus with armed conflict that initially formed part of the
customary definition of crimes against humanity may have disappeared. 110
51. In light of such developments, it is now well settled that, under international
law, criminal responsibility attaches to an individual for commit ting crimes against
humanity. As the Trial Chamber in the Tadić case indicated, “since the Nuremberg
Charter, the customary status of the prohibition against crimes against humanity and
the attribution of individual criminal responsibility for their commission have not
been seriously questioned”. 111

D.

Crimes against humanity in national law
52. In its annual report for its sixty-sixth session, 112 the Commission requested
that States provide information on: (a) whether the State ’s national law at present
expressly criminalizes “crimes against humanity” as such and, if so; (b) the text of
the relevant criminal statute(s); (c) under what conditions the State is capable of
exercising jurisdiction over an alleged offender for the commission of a crime
against humanity (e.g., when the offence occurs within its territor y or when the
offence is by its national or resident); and (d) decisions of the State ’s national courts
that have adjudicated crimes against humanity. As at early February 2015, the
Commission had received responses from four States. The information contai ned in
those responses is incorporated in the present report.
53. The national laws of several States address in some fashion crimes against
humanity, thereby allowing national prosecutions falling within the scope of those
laws. 113 For example, chapter 11 of the Criminal Code of Finland codifies crimes
against humanity (as well as genocide and war crimes). 114 Section 3 of that chapter
defines the crime, while section 4 indicates circumstances when the crime is to be
regarded as aggravated. Generally, Finnish criminal law is only applied to crimes
committed within the territory of Finland; crimes committed in another State ’s
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Korbely v. Hungary, E.Ct.H.R. Grand Chamber Judgment, No. 9174/02, para. 82 (Sept. 19, 2008).
International jurisprudence may also arise before the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.
See Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, art. 28A, as
amended at the 24th African Union Summit in Malabo (June 2014) (providing that the Court ’s
International Criminal Law Section shall have power to try persons for crimes against humanity).
As of January 2015, however, this Protocol and the amendments have not yet entered into force.
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Trial Chamber, Opinion & Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-T, para. 623
(May 7, 1997) (hereinafter Tadić 1997); see also Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF
Case), Trial Chamber I, Judgment, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, para. 58 (Mar. 2, 2009).
See 2014 Report, supra note 4, para. 34.
See generally A. Eser et al. (eds.), National Prosecution of International Crimes
(2003-2007)(6 vols.); M. Bergsmo et al. (eds.), Importing Core International Crimes into
National Law (Tokel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2d ed. 2010); R. Falconí, “The Codification
of Crimes against Humanity in the Domestic Legislation of Latin American States, ”
International Criminal Law Review, vol. 10, p. 453 (2010); W.J. van der Wolf, Prosecution and
Punishment of International Crimes by National Courts (International Courts Association,
2011). For country-specific studies, see, e.g., C. Ferstman, “Domestic Trials for Genocide and
Crimes against Humanity: The Example of Rwanda,” African J. of Int’l and Comp. L., vol. 9,
p. 857 (1997); L. van den Herik, “The Dutch Engagement with the Project of International
Criminal Justice,” Netherlands Int’l L. Rev. vol. 55, p. 303 (2010).
Criminal Code of Finland, Law No. 39/1889 (as amended 2012), available at
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1889/en18890039.pdf (unofficial English translation).
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territory by a Finnish national or resident, or by a person who is apprehended in
Finland and is a national or permanent resident of Denma rk, Iceland, Norway or
Sweden; and crimes committed in another State’s territory that are directed against
Finnish nationals and are punishable by more than six months in prison. There are,
however, exceptions to this general rule. Thus, pursuant to chapte r 1, section 7(1) of
the Criminal Code, “Finnish law applies to an offence committed outside of Finland
where the punishability of the act, regardless of the law of the place of commission,
is based on an international agreement binding on Finland or on an other statute or
regulation internationally binding on Finland (international offence).” Crimes
against humanity are regarded as being such an offence.
54. Similarly, title 12 bis of the Penal Code of Switzerland 115 codifies genocide
and crimes against humanity, with article 264a defining crimes against humanity.
Swiss law extends to crimes committed in Switzerland (article 3) and to crimes
committed outside Switzerland that are against the Swiss State (article 4), that are
against minors (article 5), that Switzerland has undertaken to prosecute under an
international agreement (article 6) or that otherwise involve an act punishable in the
State where it was committed if the perpetrator is in Switzerland and, under Swiss
law, the act may result in extradition, but the author is not extradited (if the
perpetrator is not a Swiss national, and the crime was not committed against a Swiss
national, then prosecution may only proceed if the extradition request was rejected
for a reason other than the nature of the act or the perpetrator committed a
particularly serious crime proscribed by the international community) (article 7).
55. By contrast, other States do not have any national law expressly criminalizing
“crimes against humanity,” although they may have statutes that allow for
prosecution of conduct that, in some circumstances, amount to crimes against
humanity. For example, the United States has no national law on crimes against
humanity as such. While it has statutes containing criminal prohibitions on torture ,
war crimes and genocide, 116 these statutes do not criminalize all conduct that might
amount to crimes against humanity, and some of the constituent acts of crimes
against humanity as defined in certain international texts are not found in United
States national law. At the same time, other statutes with extraterritorial application
might apply depending on the circumstances, such as statutes addressing terrorism
offences or violent crime. Cuba also does not criminalize “crimes against humanity”
as such, but its law takes account of crimes against humanity as a basis for setting
aside limitations under national law that might otherwise apply. 117
56. In the decades following Nuremberg, various national prosecutions occurred,
such as the Eichmann and Demjanjuk cases in Israel, 118 the Menten case in The
__________________
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Penal Code of Switzerland, Law No. 311.0 (as amended 2015), available at
http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19370083/index.html.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2012) (prohibiting torture); 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012) (prohibiting war
crimes); 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2012) (prohibiting genocide).
See Código Penal de la República de Cuba, Ley No. 62, art. 5, para. 3; art. 18, para. 4, available
at http://www.tsp.cu/ley_62_codigo_penal_cuba.
Attorney General for the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, I.L.R., vol. 36, p. 1 (District of
Jerusalem), p. 277 (Supreme Court of Israel) (1968); Attorney General for the Government of
Israel v. Demjanjuk, Trial Judgment (Apr. 18, 1988) (Israel District Court); Demjanjuk v. State
of Israel, Isr. S.C. 221 (1993) (Israel Supreme Court); see Hans W. Baade, “The Eichmann Trial:
Some Legal Aspects, “ Duke Law Journal, vol. 10, p. 400 (1961); J.E.S. Fawcett, “The
Eichmann Case,” British Year Book of Int’l L., vol. 38, p. 181 (1962); Georg Schwarzenberger,
“The Eichmann Judgment,” Current Legal Problems, vol. 15, p. 248 (1962).
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Netherlands, 119 the Barbie and Touvier cases in France 120 and the Finta, Mugesera
and Munyaneza cases in Canada. 121 Such cases can raise difficult issues concerning
immunities, statutes of limitations and the effect of nati onal amnesty laws. For
example, in the Rubens Paiva case currently being prosecuted in Brazil, lower
courts have allowed a prosecution to proceed against former military or police
officers alleged to have committed crimes against humanity, notwithstanding
Brazil’s 1979 amnesty law. 122 In some circumstances, the issue of crimes against
humanity arose in the context of national proceedings other than prosecutions, such
as extradition 123 or immigration 124 proceedings. Under the influence of the Rome
Statute, 125 in recent years many States have adopted or amended national laws that
criminalize crimes against humanity, as well as other crimes. 126
__________________
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Menten Case, 75 I.L.R. 362 (1987) (Dutch Supreme Court).
Barbie Case, 78 I.L.R. 125 (1988); 100 I.L.R. 331 (1995) (French Court of Cassation); Touvier
Case, 100 I.L.R. 338 (1995) (French Court of Cassation); see L. Sadat Wexler, “The
Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to
Barbie and Back Again,” Columbia J. of Transnat’l L., vol. 32, p. 289 (1994); S. Chalandon
& P. Nivelle, Crimes contre l’humanité — Barbie, Touvier, Bousquet, Papon (1998).
Regina v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, [1997] 104 I.L.R. 284 (Supreme Court of Canada);
Munyaneza v. R, 2014 QCCA 906 (Quebec Court of Appeal).
For the Federal Court of Appeals decision agreeing with the Court of First Instance in setting
aside the amnesty law, see Brasil. Tribunal Regional Federal da 2 a Região. 2 a Turma
Especializada. Habeas Corpus n. o 0104222-36.2014.4.02.0000. Impetrantes: Rodrigo Henrique
Roca Pires e Outro. Impetrado: Juízo da 4 a Vara Federal Criminal – RJ. Autuado em 26 de
Agosto de 2014 [Brazil. Federal Regional Court of the 2 nd Region. 2 nd Specialized Chamber.
Habeas Corpus no. 0104222-36.2014.4.02.0000. Rodrigo Henrique Roca Pires and Another v.
4th Federal Criminal Court, Judiciary Section of Rio de Janeiro. Issued on: August 26, 2014].
The Supreme Federal Court, however, has suspended proceedings pending determination of the
applicability of the amnesty law. See Brasil. Supremo Tribunal Federal. Rcl 18686 MC/RJ,
Relator: Min. Teori Zavascki, Decisão de 29 de setembro de 2014, publicado eletronicamente no
DJe-191 em 1 de outubro de 2014 [Brazil. Federal Supreme Court. Rcl 18686 MC/RJ,
Rapporteur: Min. Teori Zavascki, Decision of September 29, 2014, published electronically at
the DJe-191 on October 1st, 2014], available at http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/
verProcessoPeca.asp?id=263694199&tipoApp=.pdf.
See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016
(1986).
See, e.g., Mugesera v. Canada, [2005] 2 SCR 100 (Supreme Court of Canada). For an analysis
of Canada’s reliance on immigration proceedings for addressing crimes against humanity,
finding the practice to be an incomplete remedy, see J. Yap, “Aut Deportare Aut Judicare:
Current Topics in International Humanitarian Law in Canada, ” in D. Jinks et al. (eds.), Applying
International Humanitarian Law in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies, p. 355 (TMC Asser
Press, 2014).
For an analysis of how complementarity under the Rome Statute serves as an incentive to the
adoption of national legislation, and reviewing the arguments for and against finding an
obligation in the Rome Statute to adopt national legislation, see J. Kleffner, “The Impact of
Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive Criminal Law, ” J. of Int’l Crim.
Just., vol. 1, at 91 (2003) (“The Statute is ambiguous on this issue, and States as well as
academic writers differ on it”).
See, e.g., A. Alvarez, “The Implementation of the ICC Statute in Argentina,” J. of Int’l Crim.
Just., vol. 5, p. 480 (2007); Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c. 24
(CAHWCA) (Canada); F. Lafontaine, “Parties to Offences under the Canadian Crimes against
Humanity and War Crimes Act: an Analysis of Principal Liability and Complicity,” Les Cahiers
de Droit, vol. 50, p. 967 (2009); R.J. Currie & J. Rikhof, International and Transnational
Criminal Law (2d ed. 2013) (surveying the treatment of international crimes under Canadian
law); Code of Crimes against International Law, Bundesgesetzblatt, § 7, I, p. 2254 (2002)
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57. Various studies have attempted not just to compile the existence of national
laws on crimes against humanity, but to analyse the scope of those laws both in
terms of the substantive crimes and the circumstances when jurisdiction may be
exercised over such crimes. 127 Important elements to consider when assessing such
laws are: (a) whether there exists a specific law on “crimes against humanity” (as
opposed to ordinary criminal statutes on penalizing acts of violence or persecution);
(b) if a specific law exists on “crimes against humanity,” whether that law includes
all the components encompassed in the most relevant contemporary d efinition of the
crime, that is, article 7 of the Rome Statute; and (c) if a specific law exists on
“crimes against humanity,” whether that law is limited only to conduct that occurs
within the State’s territory, or whether it also extends to conduct by or against its
nationals abroad, or even extends to acts committed abroad by non -nationals against
non-nationals. 128
58. A relevant study completed in July 2013 reached several conclusions. First, it
found that earlier studies, when read collectively, indicate that at best 54 per cent of
States Members of the United Nations (104 of 193) have some form of national law
relating to crimes against humanity. 129 The remaining Member States (89 of 193)
appear to have no national laws relating to crimes against humanity. Further, the
2013 study found that earlier studies, again when read collectively, indicate that at
best 66 per cent of Rome Statute parties (80 of 121) have some form of national law
relating to crimes against humanity, leaving 44 per cent of Rome Statute parties
(41 of 121) without any such law. 130
__________________
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(Germany), available at http://www.bmjv.de/DE/Ministerium/Abteilungen/Strafrecht/
InternationalesStrafrechtEuropaeischeMultilateraleStrafrechtlicheZusammenarbeit/_doc/Gesetz_
zur_Einfuehrung_des_Voelkerstrafgesetzbuches_in_Kraft.html; N. Capus, Die Unverjährbarkeit
von Verbrechen gegen die Menschheit nach schweizerischem und nach internationalem Recht,
Zeitschrift für juristische Ausbildung und Praxis, vol. 24, p. 247 (2006); G. Werle &
F. Jessberger, “International Criminal Justice Is Coming Home: The New German Code of
Crimes Against International Law, Criminal Law Forum, vol. 13, p. 191 (2002); M. Roscini,
“Great Expectations — The Implementation of the Rome Statute in Italy,” J. of Int’l Crim. Just.,
vol. 5, p. 493 (2007); Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Act No. 27 of 2002, Rep. S. Africa Gov’t Gazette, vol. 445, No. 23642 (South Africa) (July 18,
2002); C. Fournet, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity — Misconceptions and confusion in
French Law and Practice (Hart Publishing, 2013); M. du Plessis, “South Africa’s Implementation
of the ICC Statute — An African Example,” J. of Int’l Crim. Just., vol. 5, p. 460 (2007). On
extraterritorial application of South Africa’s statute, see National Commissioner of the South
African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre (485/2012) [2013]
ZASCA 168 (Nov. 27, 2013).
See Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around
the World (2011); Bassiouni, supra note 36 (especially chapter 9 on “A Survey of National
Legislation and Prosecutions for Crimes Against Humanity”); International Committee of the
Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law National Implementation Database (updated
periodically), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf; International Human Rights Law
Clinic, George Washington University Law School, Comparative Law Study and Analysis of
National Legislation Relating to Crimes against Humanity and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
(2013), updated and reprinted in part in Arturo J. Carrillo & Annalise K. Nelson, Comparative
Law Study and Analysis of National Legislation Relating to Crimes Against Humanity and
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, The George Washington Int’l Law Rev., vol. 46, p. 481 (2014)
(hereinafter GWU Clinic Study).
For a general discussion of national jurisdiction in the context of international crimes, see
generally A. Cassese & M. Delmas-Marty (eds.), Juridictions nationales et crimes
internationaux (Presses Universitaires de France, 2002).
GWU Clinic Study, supra note 127, at 487.
Ibid at 488.
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59. Second, the 2013 study undertook an in-depth, qualitative review of the
national laws of a sample of 83 States ( States Members of the United Nations listed
alphabetically from A to I). Since 12 of those States were thought by earlier studies
to have no law relating to crimes against humanity, the qualitative review focused
on assessing the laws of the 71 other States. That review concluded that, in fact,
only 41 per cent of States in the sample actually possessed a national law
specifically on “crimes against humanity” (34 of 83). 131 Of the 58 Rome Statute
parties within the sample of 83 States, the review indicated that 48 per cent of them
possessed a national law specifically on “crimes against humanity” (28 of 58).
60. Third, for the 34 States that possessed a national law specifically on “crimes
against humanity”, the 2013 study analysed closely the provisions of those laws. Of
those States, only 29 per cent adopted verbatim the text of article 7 of the Rome
Statute when defining the crime (10 of 34). 132 As such, of the 83 States within the
sample, only about 12 per cent adopted the formulation of Rome Statute article 7 in
its entirety (10 of 83). Instead, most of the 34 States that possessed a national law
specifically on “crimes against humanity” deviated from the components of article 7,
such as by omitting components of the chapeau language of article 7(1); omitting
some prohibited acts as set forth in article 7(1)(a)–(k); or omitting the second or
third paragraphs of article 7, including the component relating to furthering “a State
or organizational policy.” All told, of those 34 States that possessed a national law
specifically on “crimes against humanity”, 71 per cent of them (24 of 34) possessed
national laws that lacked key elements of the article 7 definition, revealing a wide
range of minor to major substantive differences. 133
61. Finally, the 2013 study analysed whether the 34 States that possess a national
law specifically on “crimes against humanity” could exercise jurisdiction over a
non-national offender who commits the crime abroad against non-nationals. The
study concluded that nearly 62 per cent (21 of 34) could exercise such jurisdiction.
However, this meant that only 25 per cent of the States wit hin the sample were able
to exercise such jurisdiction over “crimes against humanity” (21 of 83). Further, of
the 58 Rome Statute parties within the sample, 33 per cent both possess a national
law specifically on “crimes against humanity” and are able to exercise such
jurisdiction (19 of 58). 134
62. A number of States have established specialized prosecutorial authorities or
procedures within their legal systems to investigate and prosecute crimes against
humanity and other international crimes. 135 These authorities, in turn, have begun
developing networks for cooperation, such as the European network of contact
points in respect of persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and
__________________
131
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Ibid., at 493. By contrast, 20 per cent of States in the sample possessed laws that did not
actually address “crimes against humanity”, but that arguably contained some features in
common with the crime, such as a prohibition of one or more of the prohibited acts listed in
Article 7(1)(a)–(k) of the Rome Statute (17 of 83). Within this group are States possessing a law
that is labelled “crimes against humanity”, but which in fact only covers war crimes and
genocide. Ibid., at 490-91. The remaining 39 per cent of States in the sample had no discernible
law relating to crimes against humanity (32 of 83).
Ibid., at 492.
Ibid., at 493-95, 497-503.
Ibid., at 505-13.
See, e.g., Canada’s Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Program, available at
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cj-jp/wc-cdg/index.html.
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war crimes. 136 The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) has
established a fugitive investigative support subdirectorate dedicated to facilitating
the apprehension and extradition of individuals accused of such crimes. 137
63. Separate and apart from statutes providing for the criminal prosecution of
crimes against humanity, some States have also included the prohibition on crimes
against humanity in their immigration rules. 138 Such provisions indicate that
persons accused of the commission of crimes against humanity may be barred entry
to the country in question, may be removed and/or deported and may be prosecuted
for committing fraud upon entry.
64. The unevenness in the adoption of national laws relating to crimes against
humanity has collateral consequences with respect to inter-State cooperation in
seeking to sanction offences. Existing bilateral and multilateral agreements on
mutual legal assistance and on extradition typically require that the offence at issue
be criminalized in the jurisdictions of both the requesting and requested States
(referred to as “double” or “dual” criminality); if their respective national laws are
not comparable, then cooperation usually is not required. With a large number of
States having no national law on crimes against humanity, and with significant
discrepancies among the national laws of States that have criminalized the offence,
there at present exist considerable impediments to inter-State cooperation. Further,
the absence in most States of national laws that allow for the exercise of jurisdiction
over non-nationals for crimes against humanity inflicted upon non-nationals abroad
means that offenders often may seek sanctuary simply by moving to a State in
which the acts were not committed. Even in circumstances in which States have
adopted harmonious national laws on crimes against humanity, there may exist no
obligation as between the States to cooperate with respect to the offence, including
by way of an obligation to extradite or prosecute the alleged offender.

IV. Existing multilateral conventions that promote prevention,
criminalization and inter-State cooperation with respect
to crimes
65. In pursuing the objectives identified in section II above, the Commission may
be guided by numerous existing multilateral conventions that promote prevention,
criminalization and inter-State cooperation with respect to transnational crimes. The
Commission has previously helped draft a convention of this nature: the 1973
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents. 139 Of particular interest are the
__________________
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This network was set up pursuant to European Council Decision 2002/494/JHA and reaffirmed
with Council Decision 2003/335/JHA.
See INTERPOL’s War Crimes Program, available at http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Warcrimes/War-crimes.
See, e.g., Canada, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, C.27 (as amended on
December 16, 2014); U.S. Presidential Proclamation 8697 (Aug. 4, 2011) — Suspension of
Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons Who Participate in Serious Human Rights
and Humanitarian Law Violations and Other Abuses, Fed. Reg., vol. 76, p. 49277 (2011).
Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167. Draft prepared by the Commission at its twenty -fourth
session in 1972; the Convention was then negotiated and adopted by the General Assembly in
1973, entered into force in 1977, and as of January 2015 has 178 States Parties.
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conventions relating to genocide and war crimes, as well as other treaties that seek
to deal comprehensively with specific crimes, such as conventions relating to State sponsored torture, enforced disappearance, transnational corruption and organized
crime and terrorist-related offences. Likewise, multilateral conventions on
extradition, mutual legal assistance and statutes of limitation can provide important
guidance with respect to those issues. The following disc ussion briefly addresses
some aspects of these treaties.

A.

1948 Genocide Convention
66. The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide 140 sets forth in article I that the Contracting Parties “confirm that
genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law which they undertake to prevent and punish ”. Article II then
defines the crime in terms that were later adopted verbatim as article 6 of the Rome
Statute. Article III identifies that the act itself shall be punishable, but so shall
conspiracy, incitement and attempt to commit the act, as well as complicity in the
act. Article IV provides that persons committing genocide or any of the other acts
enumerated in article III (such as complicity in genocide) shall be punished
“whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals”.
67. Article V provides: “The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance
with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the
provisions of the present Convention and, in particular to provide effective penalties
for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III. ”
Article VI provides that persons charged with genocide shall be tried by a
competent national tribunal “in the territory of which the act was committed, or by
such international tribunal as may have jurisdiction”. Article VII addresses
extradition, stating that the act of genocide shall not be considered as “political
crimes” and that the parties “pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in
accordance with their laws and treaties in force”. Article VIII recalls that any party
may call upon competent United Nations organs to take action to prevent and
suppress genocide, while article IX provides that disputes arising under the
convention shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of
any of the parties to the dispute.
68. As is the case for crimes against humanity, the crime of genocide has been
included in the statutes of various international criminal tribunals and developed in
their jurisprudence. Moreover, the 1948 Genocide Convention has featured in
several decisions of the International Court of Justice relevant to interpretation of
the Convention. 141

__________________
140

141

34/88

Genocide Convention, supra note 26; see also A. Gil Gil, El genocidio y otros crímenes
internacionales (UNED, 1999); P. Gaeta (ed.), The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary
(Oxford University Press, 2009); C. Tams et al. (eds.), Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: A Commentary (Hart Publishing, 2013).
Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 15;
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Judgment on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction,
I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595; 2007 Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro Judgment,
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B.

1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I 142
69. The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 143 contain in a common article 144 an
identical mechanism for the prosecution of persons accused of havin g committed
“grave breaches” 145 of the Conventions. Pursuant to the first paragraph of the
common article, the parties “undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any
of the grave breaches” of the Conventions. In its second paragraph, the common
article specifies that:
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for
persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such
grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality,
before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another

__________________
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supra note 6; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia), Judgment on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction, I.C.J.
Reports 2008, p. 412; 2015 Croatia v. Serbia Genocide Judgment, supra note 6.
The analysis in this sub-section is drawn from Study by the Secretariat, Survey of multilateral
conventions, which may be relevant to the work of the International Law Commission on the
topic “The Obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare),” U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/630, at 17-18, 22-23 (June 18, 2010).
Geneva Convention relative to the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (Geneva Convention I); Geneva
Convention relative to the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (Geneva Convention II );
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
(Geneva Convention III); Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Geneva Convention I V).
Geneva Convention I, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, art. 129;
Geneva Convention IV, art. 146.
Each Convention contains an article describing what acts constitute “grave breaches” of that
particular convention. For Geneva Conventions I and II, this article is identical (arts. 50 and 51,
respectively): “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving
any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the C onvention:
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” Article 130
of Geneva Convention III reads: “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be
those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by
the Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments,
wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war
to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a pri soner of war of the rights
of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.” Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV
reads: “Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the
following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention:
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful
confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a
hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial
prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly.”
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High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has
made out a prima facie case.
70. This obligation to undertake measures against an alleged offender is not
conditioned by any jurisdictional nexus of the offender to the State party in which
the offender is present. The obligation is one of prosecution, with the possibility to
transfer an accused person as an alternative. Further, the obligation to search for and
prosecute an alleged offender exists irrespective of any request for transfer by
another party. 146
71. While the obligation described above is limited to grave breaches, the common
article further provides, in its third paragraph, that the States parties shall take
measures to suppress all acts contrary to the Conventions other than the grave
breaches. Finally, under its fourth paragraph, the common article stipulates that the
accused “shall benefit by safeguards of proper trial and defence ” in all
circumstances, and that those safeguards “shall not be less favourable than those
provided by Article 105 and those following” of the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Other articles briefly address the responsibility
of States parties for violations of the conventions and the possibility of a procedure
for enquiry concerning any alleged violation of the Conventions. 147
72. The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
builds upon the provision concerning the punishment of offenders contained in the
common article to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 148 In essence, the common article
is made applicable to Protocol I by renvoi; article 85(1) of Protocol I specifies that
“[t]he provisions of the Conventions relating to the repression of breaches and grave
breaches, supplemented by this Section, shall apply to the repression of breaches
and grave breaches of this Protocol”. 149 Protocol I also builds upon the Geneva
Conventions with a series of articles designed to help repress breaches: article 86
addresses a State’s failure to act; article 87 addresses the duty of commanders;
article 88 addresses mutual assistance in criminal matters; 150 article 89 addresses
inter-State cooperation in situations of serious violations of the Geneva Conventi ons
or Protocol I; article 90 addresses the establishment of an international fact -finding
commission to investigate facts alleged to be a grave breach; and article 91
addresses the responsibility of States parties to pay compensation for violations of
the Geneva Conventions or Protocol I.

__________________
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See J. Pictet (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Commentary, vol. IV, p. 593
(ICRC, 1958).
See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, Arts. 131–32.
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (Protocol I).
“Grave breaches” of Protocol I are identified at Articles 11 and 85(2)-(4) of Protocol I.
Article 88(1) provides that the States Parties “shall afford one another the greatest measure of
assistance in connexion with criminal proceedings brought in respect of grave breaches of the
Conventions or of this Protocol.” Article 88(2) specifies that the parties to Protocol I shall,
when the circumstances allow, cooperate in extradition matters, including giving due
consideration to a request received from the State in whose territory the alleged offence has
occurred. Article 88(3) provides that the law of the requested party shall apply in all cases and
that the paragraphs shall not “affect the obligations arising from the provisions of any other
treaty of a bilateral or multilateral nature which governs or will govern the whole or part of the
subject of mutual assistance in criminal matters.”
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C.

Other potentially relevant conventions
73. Contemporary definitions of crimes against humanity include acts such as
“torture”, “enslavement” and “enforced disappearance of persons” as the types of
acts that, if committed on a widespread or systematic basis against a civilian
population, can constitute crimes against humanity. As such, when drafting a
convention on crimes against humanity, account should be taken of conventions that
address such acts.
74. For example, the Convention against Torture sets forth a series of articles that
define the crime, call upon States parties to prevent the crime, criminalize the
conduct, establish jurisdiction over the conduct and impose an obligation to
extradite or prosecute an offender that turns up in the State Party’s territory.
Numerous other provisions address other aspects of the State party’s obligations, as
well as inter-State cooperation and dispute resolution. As at January 2015,
156 States are party to this convention. The International Court of Justice recently
addressed at some length the aut dedere aut judicare obligation contained within
this convention, 151 which was in turn the subject of a report by the Commission in
2014. 152
75. The 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime 153 has a Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children. 154 The protocol defines the crime of trafficking,
requires States parties to incorporate the crime into their national l aws, and requires
them to adopt prevention measures. The provisions of the convention, which apply
mutatis mutandis to the protocol, set forth various obligations relating to
prosecution, jurisdiction, adjudication and sanctions, as well as extradition, mu tual
legal assistance and other matters. As of January 2015, 166 States are party to this
protocol.
76. Likewise, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance 155 contains provisions regarding defining the crime,
criminalization of the act in national law, aut dedere aut judicare, mutual legal
assistance and extradition. Notably, article 5 of the convention provides that: “The
widespread or systematic practice of enforced disappearance constitutes a crime
against humanity as defined in applicable international law and shall attract the
consequences provided for under such applicable international law. ” 156 As at
January 2015, 44 States are party to this convention.
77. There are, of course, numerous other global treaties that address issues of
prevention, criminalization in national law, aut dedere aut judicare, mutual legal
assistance, extradition, dispute settlement and other issues potentially relevant to a

__________________
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Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, supra note 73.
2014 Report, supra note 4, at 130-52, para. 65.
Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209. As of January 2015, there are 179 States Parties to this
convention.
Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319.
Dec. 20, 2006, 2716 U.N.T.S. 3. As of January 2015, there are 44 States Parties to this
convention.
Id., art. 5; see M. Lot Vermeulen, Enforced Disappearance: Determining State Responsibility
under the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from E nforced
Disappearance, at 60-62 (Intersentia, 2012).
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convention on crimes against humanity. Moreover, there are a lso some relevant
treaties operating at the regional or subregional levels, such as the Protocol for the
Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination. 157 All such treaties should be
considered in the course of the Commission’s work, bearing in mind that the value
and effectiveness of particular provisions must be assessed in context.

V. Preventing and punishing crimes against humanity
78. Treaties that address efforts to criminalize acts are largely focused on
punishment of individuals for the crime once committed, but many also contain an
obligation of some type that the States parties prevent the crime as well. Such an
obligation may be set forth in a single article that speaks broadly to the issue of
prevention or may be embedded in several articles that collectively seek the same
end.
79. At the most general level, such an obligation simply requires the States parties
to undertake to prevent (as well as punish) the acts in question. Thus, article I of the
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
provides: “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in
time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they
undertake to prevent and to punish.” 158 Much of the remainder of the convention is
then focused on specific measures relating to punishment of individuals, although
some provisions also relate to the issue of prevention. 159
80. This general obligation to prevent manifests itself in two ways. First, it
imposes upon States parties an obligation not “to commit such acts through their
own organs, or persons over whom they have such firm control that their conduct is
attributable to the State concerned under international law”. 160 Second, it imposes
upon States parties an obligation “to employ the means at their disposal … to
prevent persons or groups not directly under their authority from committing ” such
acts. 161 For the latter, the State party is only expected to use its best efforts (a due
diligence standard) when it has a “capacity to influence effectively the action of
persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide”, which in turn depends
__________________
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Nov. 29, 2006 (entered into force in 2008). The International Conference on the Great Lakes
Region of Africa, which developed this protocol, consists of Angola, Burundi, the Central
African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Republic
of South Sudan, the Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. The
instrument is a protocol to the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes
Region, Dec. 15, 2006 (amended 2012).
Genocide Convention, art. I.
Article V provides: “The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their
respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the pre sent
Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or
any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3.” Article VIII provides: “Any Contracting Party
may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to t ake such action under the Charter
of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3. ”
2007 Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro Judgment, su pra note 6, para. 166.
Ibid., para. 430; see also B. Simma, “Genocide and the International Court of Justice,” in
C. Safferling and E. Conze (eds.), The Genocide Convention Sixty Years After its Adoption,
p. 259, at 262 (Asser 2010).
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on the State party’s geographic, political and other links to the persons or groups at
issue. Further, the State party is only obligated to do what it legally can do under
international law. 162
81. A breach of this general obligation implicates the responsibility of the State if
the conduct at issue (either commission of the proscribed act or a failure to take
necessary, appropriate and lawful measures to prevent the proscribed act by another)
is attributable to the State pursuant to the rules on State responsibility. Indeed, in the
context of disputes that may arise under the Genocide Convention, article IX refers,
inter alia, to disputes “relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide ”.
Although much of the focus of the Genocide Convention is upon prosecuting
individuals for the crime of genocide, the International Court of Justice has stressed
that the breach of the obligation to prevent is not a criminal violation by the State
but, rather, concerns a breach of international law that engages traditional State
responsibility. 163 The Court’s approach is consistent with views previously
expressed by the Commission, 164 including in commentary to the 2001 articles on
responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts: “Where crimes against
international law are committed by State officials, it will often be the case that the
State itself is responsible for the acts in question or for failure to prevent or punish
them.” 165
82. Many conventions also contain a different type of “prevention” obligation,
which is an obligation to pursue specific measures designed to help prevent the
offence from occurring, such as by obliging States parties to take effective
legislative, executive, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent the
conduct from occurring in any territory under their jurisdiction. Depending on the
particular crime at issue, and the context in which that State party is operating, such
measures might be pursued in various ways. The State party might be expected to
pursue initiatives that educate governmental officials as to the State ’s obligations
under the relevant treaty regime. Training programmes for police, military, militias
and other personnel might be necessary to help prevent the proscribed act. National
laws and policies will likely be necessary to establish awareness of the criminalit y
of the act and to promote early detection of any risk of its commission. Certainly
once the proscribed act is committed, such an obligation reinforces other obligations
within the treaty that require the State party to investigate and prosecute or extrad ite
offenders, since doing so serves, in part, to deter future acts by others. Here, too,
international responsibility of the State arises if the State party has failed to use its
best efforts to organize the governmental apparatus, as necessary and approp riate, to
minimize the likelihood of the proscribed act being committed.
__________________
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2007 Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro Judgment, supra note 6, para. 430 (finding
that “it is clear that every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law ”);
see C. Tams, “Article I,” in Tams et al., supra note 140, at 51 (“The duty to prevent may require
state parties to make use of existing options but it does not create new rights of intervention —
hence, to give just one example, the recognition of a duty to prevent adds very little to debates
about the unilateral use of force to stop genocide in so-called ‘humanitarian interventions’.”).
2007 Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro Judgment, supra note 6, para. 167 (finding
that international responsibility is “quite different in nature from criminal responsibility”).
See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 50th session, I.L.C.
Yearbook 1998, Vol. II, Part 2, at 65, para. 248 (finding that the Genocide Convention “did not
envisage State crime or the criminal responsibility of States in its article IX concerning State
responsibility.”).
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 53rd session, I.L.C. Yearbook
2001, Vol. II, Part. 2, at 142 (para. 3 of the Commentary to Article 58).
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83. For egregious offences, such provisions are often accompanied by a further
provision indicating that no exceptional circumstances (such as the existence of an
armed conflict or a public emergency) may be invoked as a justification for the
offence. Such a general statement, sometimes placed at the beginning of the treaty,
stresses that the obligation not to commit the offence is non -derogable in nature.
84. The following discussion centres on the treatment of an “obligation to
prevent” in a range of treaties relevant to crimes against humanity, in comments by
treaty monitoring bodies that seek to interpret such an obligation, in General
Assembly resolutions, in international case la w and in the writings of publicists. The
present section then concludes with a proposed draft article, consisting of three
paragraphs, entitled “Prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity.”

A.
1.

Obligation to prevent crimes against humanity
Treaties
85. As discussed above, and as indicated in section IV.A of this report, the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide contains
within its title the notion that States parties are obligated not just to punish per sons
who commit genocide, but also to take measures to prevent commission of the
crime. As noted in section IV.B of this report, the 1949 Geneva Conventions
identify certain acts that are grave breaches of the conventions and provide that:
“The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to
provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be
committed, any of the grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the
following Article.” 166 The Conventions further provide that: “Each High
Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for the suppression of all acts
contrary to the provisions of the present Convention other than the grave breaches
defined in the following Article.” 167
86. Such obligations to prevent and suppress crimes have been a feature of most
multilateral treaties addressing transnational crimes since the 1960s. Examples
include:
• Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, 23 September 1971, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 974,
No. 14118 (art. 10(1): “Contracting States shall, in accordance with
international and national law, endeavour to take all practicable measures for
the purpose of preventing the offences mentioned in Article 1. ”)
• Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 14 December
1973, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1035, No. 15410 (art. 4(1): “States
Parties shall co-operate in the prevention of the crimes set forth in article 2,
particularly by taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their
respective territories for the commission of those crimes within or outside
their territories ….”)

__________________
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Geneva Convention I, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, art. 129;
Geneva Convention IV, art. 146.
Ibid.
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• International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, 30 November 1973, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1015,
No. 14861 (art. 4(a): “The States Parties to the present Convention undertake …
[t]o adopt any legislative or other measures necessary to suppress as well as to
prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and similar
segregationist policies or their manifestations and to punish persons guilty of
that crime ….”)
• International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 17 December 1979,
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1316, No. 21931 (art. 4(1): “States Parties
shall co-operate in the prevention of the offences set forth in article 1,
particularly by: taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in their
respective territories for the commission of … offences … including measures
to prohibit in their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and
organizations that encourage, instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration
of acts of taking of hostages.”)
• Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465,
No. 24841 (art. 2(1): “Each State Party shall take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any
territory under its jurisdiction.”)
• Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, 9 December 1985,
OAS Treaty Series, No. 67 (art. 1: “The State Parties undertake to prevent and
punish torture in accordance with the terms of this Convention.”; art. 6: “The
States Parties likewise shall take effective measures to prevent and punish
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment within their
jurisdiction.”)
• Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, 9 June
1994, International Legal Materials, vol. XXV, 1994, p. 1529 (art. 1(c): “The
States Parties to this Convention undertake … [t]o cooperate with one another
in helping to prevent, punish, and eliminate the forced disappear ance of
persons; [t]o take legislative, administrative, judicial, and any other measures
necessary to comply with the commitments undertaken in this Convention. ”)
• Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,
9 December 1994, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2051, No. 34547
(art. 11: “States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the crimes set out
in article 9, particularly by: (a) Taking all practicable measures to prevent
preparations in their respective territories for the commission of those crimes
within or outside their territories; and (b) Exchanging information in
accordance with their national law and coordinating the taking of
administrative and other measures as appropriate to prevent the commission of
those crimes.”)
• International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,
15 December 1997, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2149, No. 37517
(art. 15(a): “States Parties shall cooperate in the prevention of the offences set
forth in article 2 ….”)
• United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,
15 November 2000, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2225, No. 39574
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(art. 9(1): “In addition to the measures set forth in article 8 of this Convention,
each State Party shall, to the extent appropriate and consistent with its legal
system, adopt legislative, administrative or other effective measures to
promote integrity and to prevent, detect and punish the corruption of public
officials”; art. 9(2): “Each State Party shall take measures to ensure effective
action by its authorities in the prevention, detection and punishment of the
corruption of public officials, including providing such authorities with
adequate independence to deter the exertion of inappropriate influence on their
actions”; art. 29(1): “Each State Party shall, to the extent necessary, initiate,
develop or improve specific training programmes for its law enforcement
personnel, including prosecutors, investigating magistrates and customs
personnel, and other personnel charged with the prevention, detection and
control of the offences covered by this Convention”; art. 31(1): “States Parties
shall endeavour to develop and evaluate national projects and to establish and
promote best practices and policies aimed at the prevention of transnational
organized crime”.)
• Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, United Nations , Treaty
Series, vol. 2237, No. 39574 (art. 9(1): “States Parties shall establish
comprehensive policies, programmes and other measures: (a) To prevent and
combat trafficking in persons; and (b) To protect victims of trafficking in
persons, especially women and children, from revictimization.”)
• Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 18 December 2002, United Nations,
Treaty Series, vol. 2375, No. 24841 (preamble: “Recalling that the effective
prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment requires education and a combination of various legislative,
administrative, judicial and other measures”; art. 3 “Each State party shall set
up, designate or maintain at the domestic level one or several visiting bodies
for the prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment ...”)
• International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, 20 December 2006, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2716,
No. 48088 (preamble: “Determined to prevent enforced disappearances and to
combat impunity for the crime of enforced disappearance ”; art. 23: “1. Each
State Party shall ensure that the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or
military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be
involved in the custody or treatment of any person deprived of liberty includes
the necessary education and information regarding the relevant provisions of
this Convention, in order to: (a) Prevent the involvement of such officials in
enforced disappearances; (b) Emphasize the importance of prevention and
investigations in relation to enforced disappearances; (c) Ensure that the
urgent need to resolve cases of enforced disappearance is recognized. 2. Each
State Party shall ensure that orders or instructions prescribing, authorizing or
encouraging enforced disappearance are prohibited. Each State Party shall
guarantee that a person who refuses to obey such an order will not be
punished. 3. Each State Party shall take the necessary measures to ensure that
the persons referred to in paragraph 1 of this article who have reason to
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believe that an enforced disappearance has occurred or is planned report the
matter to their superiors and, where necessary, to the appropriate authorities or
bodies vested with powers of review or remedy.”) 168
• Protocol for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination,
29 November 2006 (art. 8(1): “The Member States recognise that the crime of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are crimes under
international law and are crimes against people’s rights which they undertake
to prevent and punish.”)
87. Some multilateral human rights treaties, even though not focused on the
prevention and punishment of crimes as such, contain relevant obligations to
prevent and suppress serious human rights violations. Examples include:
• International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660,
No. 9464 (art. 3: “States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and
apartheid and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradi cate all practices of this
nature in territories under their jurisdiction.”)
• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, No. 20378 (art. 2:
“States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree
to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
discrimination against women”; art. 3: “States Parties shall take in all ﬁelds, in
particular in the political, social, economic and cultural ﬁelds, all appropriate
measures, including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement
of women, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men ”)
• Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against
Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention), May 11, 2011, Council
of Europe Treaty Series No. 210 (art. 4(2): “Parties condemn all forms of
discrimination against women and take, without delay, the necessary
legislative and other measures to prevent it, in particular by: embodying in
their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation the principle of
equality between women and men and ensuring the practical realisation of this
principle; prohibiting discrimination against women, including through the use
of sanctions, where appropriate; abolishing laws and practices wh ich
discriminate against women.”)
Some treaties do not refer expressly to “prevention” or “elimination” of the act but,
rather, focus on an obligation to take appropriate legislative, administrative and
other measures to “give effect” to or to “implement” the treaty, which may be seen
as encompassing necessary or appropriate measures to prevent the act. 169 Examples
include:
__________________
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169
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• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966,
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, No. 14668: “Where not already
provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its
constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.”)
• Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations,
Treaty Series, vol. 1577, No. 27531 (art. 4: “States Parties shall undertake all
appropriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the
implementation of the rights recognized in the present Convention. ”)
88. As such, in treaties relating to crimes of the type enumerated in the definition
of crimes against humanity (such as torture or apartheid), treaties relating to
transnational crimes (such as transnational organized crime) and human rights
treaties, an obligation to prevent the act at issue is commonly included. The
obligation may be stated in a general fashion or may indicate, with a greater or
lesser degree of specificity, that the State party shall take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent the proscribed acts.
2.

Comments by treaty bodies
89. In some instances, committees established by such treaties have addressed the
meaning of the obligation to prevent as contained in the relevant treaty. 170 Thus, in
its general comment No. 2, the Committee against Torture addressed a State party ’s
obligation to prevent State-sponsored torture under article 2 of the 1984 Convention
against Torture. The Committee stated in part:
2.
Article 2, paragraph 1 obliges each State party to take actions that
will reinforce the prohibition against torture through legislative,
administrative, judicial, or other actions that must, in the end, be effective in
preventing it. To ensure that measures are in fact taken that are known to
prevent or punish any acts of torture, the Convention outlines in subsequent
articles obligations for the State party to take measures specified therein.
3.

The obligation to prevent torture in article 2 is wide -ranging.…

4.
States parties are obligated to eliminate any legal or other obstacles
that impede the eradication of torture and ill-treatment; and to take positive
effective measures to ensure that such conduct and any recurrences thereof are
effectively prevented. States parties also have the obligation continually to
keep under review and improve their national laws and performance under the
Convention in accordance with the Committee’s concluding observations and
views adopted on individual communications. If the measures adopted by the
State party fail to accomplish the purpose of eradicating acts of torture, the
Convention requires that they be revised and/or that new, more effective
measures be adopted. Likewise, the Committee’s understanding of and

__________________
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recommendations in respect of effective measures are in a process of continual
evolution, as, unfortunately, are the methods of torture and ill -treatment. 171
90. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination addressed a State
party’s obligation to prevent racial discrimination in its general recommendation
No. 31. In that recommendation, the Committee provided guidance on strategies
States could employ to uphold their obligation to prevent discrimination, such as
implementing national strategies or “plans of action aimed at the elimination of
structural racial discrimination”, 172 eliminating laws that target specific segments of
the population 173 and developing “through appropriate education programmes,
training in respect for human rights, tolerance and friendship among racial or ethnic
groups, as well as sensitization to intercultural relations, for law enforcement
officials”. 174
91. Likewise, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
addressed a State party’s obligation to prevent violations of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, principally in its
general recommendations Nos. 6, 15 and 19. In general recommendation No. 6, the
Committee recommended that States parties “[e]stablish and/or strengthen effective
national machinery, institutions and procedures, at a high level of Government, and
with adequate resources, commitment and authority to … [m]onitor the situation of
women comprehensively; [h]elp formulate new policies and effectively carry out
strategies and measures to eliminate discrimination” and also “[t]ake appropriate
steps to ensure the dissemination of the Convention”. 175 In general recommendation
No. 15, the Committee recommended that States parties report on their efforts to
prevent specific discrimination against women who have contracted AIDS. 176 In
general recommendation No. 19, the Committee emphasized that:
under article 2(e) the Convention calls on States parties to take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person,
organization or enterprise. Under general international law and specific human
rights covenants, States may also be responsible for private acts if they fail to
act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and
punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation. 177
92. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in its report on “Citizen
security and human rights”, noted that one of the main obligations of the state in
upholding human rights “is linked to the judicial clarification of criminal conduct
__________________
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with the view to eliminating impunity and preventing the recurrence of violence …
[u]ndoubtedly the adequate and effective administration of justice on the part of the
judicial branch and to an appropriate extent, of disciplinary entities, has a
fundamental role … in terms of the lessening of the risk and the scope of
violence.” 178
93. With respect to treaties that focus on an obligation to take appropriate
legislative, administrative and other measures to “give effect” to or to “implement”
the treaty, the relevant treaty bodies have also issued comments. Thus, the Human
Rights Committee, in its general comment No. 3, emphasized, in part, “that all
administrative and judicial authorities should be aware of the obligations which the
State party has assumed under the Covenant. To this end, the Covenant should be
publicized in all official languages of the State and steps should be taken to
familiarize the authorities concerned with its contents as part of their training ”. 179
The Committee on the Rights of the Child, in general comment No. 5, sought to
clarify what was meant by “general measures of implementation” and determined
that they:
are intended to promote the full enjoyment of all rights in the Convention …
through legislation, the establishment of coordinating and monitoring
bodies … comprehensive data collection, awareness-raising and training and
the development and implementation of appropriate policies, services and
programmes. 180
In general comment No. 6, the Committee provided guidance on various measures
for preventing mistreatment of unaccompanied and separated children located
outside their country of origin, including prevention of trafficking and sexual
exploitation, prevention of their military recruitment and prevention of their
detention. 181
3.

United Nations resolutions
94. The General Assembly has periodically made reference to an obligatio n of
States to prevent crimes against humanity. For example, in its 1973 Principles of
international co-operation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of
persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Assembly recognized
a general responsibility for inter-State cooperation and intra-State action to prevent
the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Among other things, the
Assembly declared that “States shall co-operate with each other on a bilateral and
multilateral basis with a view to halting and preventing war crimes and crimes
against humanity, and shall take the domestic and international measures necessary
for that purpose”. 182 In its 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
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Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, the
Assembly stated that the “obligation to respect, ensure respect for and implement
international human rights law and international humanitarian law as provided for
under the respective bodies of law, includes, inter alia, the duty to … [t]ake
appropriate legislative and administrative and other appropriate measures to prevent
violations”. 183
4.

Case law
95. In Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), the
International Court of Justice analysed the meaning of “undertake to prevent” as
contained in article I of the 1948 Genocide Convention. At the provisional measures
phase, the Court determined that the undertaking in article I imposes “a clear
obligation” on the two parties “to do all in their power to prevent the commission of
any such acts in the future”. 184 At the merits phase, the Court described such an
undertaking as “a formal promise … not merely hortatory or purposive … and is not
to be read merely as an introduction to later express references to legislation,
prosecution and extradition”.185
96. The Court then indicated two types of obligations associated with article I,
beginning with the obligation that a State itself not commit genocide:
Under Article I the States parties are bound to prevent such an act, which
it describes as “a crime under international law”, being committed. The Article
does not expressis verbis require States to refrain from themselves committing
genocide. However, in the view of the Court, taking into account the
established purpose of the Convention, the effect of Article I is to prohibit
States from themselves committing genocide. Such a prohibition follows, first,
from the fact that the Article categorizes genocide as “a crime under
international law”: by agreeing to such a categorization, the States parties must
logically be undertaking not to commit the act so described. Secondly, it
follows from the expressly stated obligation to prevent the commission of acts
of genocide. That obligation requires the States parties, inter alia, to employ
the means at their disposal, in circumstances to be described mor e specifically
later in this Judgment, to prevent persons or groups not directly under their
authority from committing an act of genocide or any of the other acts
mentioned in Article III. It would be paradoxical if States were thus under an
obligation to prevent, so far as within their power, commission of genocide by
persons over whom they have a certain influence, but were not forbidden to
commit such acts through their own organs, or persons over whom they have
such firm control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under
international law. In short, the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily
implies the prohibition of the commission of genocide. 186
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97. The Court also decided that the substantive obligation reflected in article I wa s
not, on its face, limited by territory but, rather, applied “to a State wherever it may
be acting or may be able to act in ways appropriate to meeting the obligation[] in
question.” 187 Later in the judgment, the Court addressed in greater depth the
obligation that a State party employ the means at its disposal to prevent persons or
groups not under its authority from committing genocide. The Court said:
it is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of
result, in the sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed,
whatever the circumstances, in preventing the commission of genocide: the
obligation of States parties is rather to employ all means reasonably available
to them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible. A State does not incur
responsibility simply because the desired result is not achieved; responsibility
is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to
prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have
contributed to preventing the genocide. In this area the notion of “due
diligence,” which calls for an assessment in concreto, is of critical importance.
Various parameters operate when assessing whether a State has duly
discharged the obligation concerned. The first, which varies greatly from one
State to another, is clearly the capacity to influence effectively the action of
persons likely to commit, or already committing, genocide. This capacity itself
depends, among other things, on the geographical distance of the State
concerned from the scene of the events, and on the strength of the political
links, as well as links of all other kinds, between the authorities of that State
and the main actors in the events. The State’s capacity to influence must also
be assessed by legal criteria, since it is clear that every State may only act
within the limits permitted by international law; seen thus, a State ’s capacity to
influence may vary depending on its particular legal position vis -à-vis the
situations and persons facing the danger, or the reality, of genocide. On the
other hand, it is irrelevant whether the State whose responsibility is in issue
claims, or even proves, that even if it had employed all means reasonably at its
disposal, they would not have sufficed to prevent the commission of genocide.
As well as being generally difficult to prove, this is irrelevant to the breach of
the obligation of conduct in question, the more so since the possibility remains
that the combined efforts of several States, each complyi ng with its obligation
to prevent, might have achieved the result — averting the commission of
genocide — which the efforts of only one State were insufficient to produce. 188
98.

In this context, the Court continued,
a State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the
instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the
existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed. From that moment
onwards, if the State has available to it means likely to have a deterrent effect
on those suspected of preparing genocide, or reasonably suspected of
harbouring specific intent (dolus specialis), it is under a duty to make such use
of these means as the circumstances permit. 189
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99. The Court stressed that breach of this type of obligation to prevent “results
from mere failure to adopt and implement suitable measures to prevent genocide
from being committed. In other words … violation of the obligation to prevent
results from omission” and, as such, “the duty to prevent places States under
positive obligations, to do their best to ensure that such acts do not occur ”. 190 To
incur responsibility, “it is enough that the State was aware, or should normally have
been aware, of the serious danger that acts of genocide would be co mmitted”. 191 At
the same time, the Court maintained that “a State can be held responsible for
breaching the obligation to prevent genocide only if genocide was actually
committed”. 192
100. The Court also addressed the distinction between prevention and punishm ent.
While “one of the most effective ways of preventing criminal acts, in general, is to
provide penalties for persons committing such acts, and to impose those penalties
effectively on those who commit the acts one is trying to prevent ”, 193 the Court
found that “the duty to prevent genocide and the duty to punish its perpetrators …
are … two distinct yet connected obligations.” 194 Indeed, the “obligation on each
contracting State to prevent genocide is both normative and compelling. It is not
merged in the duty to punish, nor can it be regarded as simply a component of that
duty.” 195
101. The Court cautioned that the “content of the duty to prevent varies from one
instrument to another, according to the wording of the relevant provisions, and
depending on the nature of the acts to be prevented”, and hence the Court’s decision
did not “purport to establish a general jurisprudence applicable to all cases where a
treaty instrument, or other binding legal norm, includes an obligation for States to
prevent certain acts”. 196
102. The 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms 197 contains no express obligation to “prevent” violations of
the Convention, but the European Court of Human Rights has construed individual
articles to contain such an obligation. Thus, in Kilic v. Turkey, the Court found that
article 2(1) of the Convention, on the right to life, obliged a State party not only to
refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate
steps within its domestic legal system to safeguard the lives of those within its
jurisdiction. 198 Construing the same article in Makaratzis v. Greece, the Court
determined that this “involves a primary duty on the State to secure the right to life
by putting in place an appropriate legal and administrative framework to deter the
__________________
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commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement
machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such
provisions”. 199
103. At the same time, the Court has recognized that the State party’s obligation in
this regard is limited. In Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, the Court found:
Bearing in mind the difficulties in policing modern societies, the
unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be
made in terms of priorities and resources, the positive obligation [of article 2(1)]
must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or
disproportionate burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed risk
to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to take
operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. For a positive
obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to
have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life
of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party
and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which,
judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. 200
104. The 1969 American Convention on Human Rights 201 also contains no express
obligation to “prevent” violations of the Convention. Even so, when construing the
obligation of the States parties to “ensure” the free and full exercise of the rights
recognized by the Convention, 202 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
found that this obligation implies a “duty to prevent”, which in turn requires the
State party to pursue certain steps. Specifically, the Court in Velasquez Rodriguez v.
Honduras found:
166. … This obligation implies the duty of the States parties to organize the
governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which
public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the
free and full enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of this obligation,
the States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights
recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the
right violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting
from the violation.
174. The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human
rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious
investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those
responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim
adequate compensation.
__________________
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175. This duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political,
administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights
and ensure that any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts, which,
as such, may lead to the punishment of those responsible and the obligation to
indemnify the victims for damages. It is not possible to make a detail ed list of
all such measures, since they vary with the law and the conditions of each
State party. Of course, while the State is obligated to prevent human rights
abuses, the existence of a particular violation does not, in itself, prove the
failure to take preventive measures. On the other hand, subjecting a person to
official, repressive bodies that practice torture and assassination with impunity
is itself a breach of the duty to prevent violations of the rights to life and
physical integrity of the person, even if that particular person is not tortured or
assassinated, or if those facts cannot be proven in a concrete case. 203
105. Similar reasoning has animated the Court’s approach to interpretation of
article 6 of the 1966 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. For
example, in Tibi v. Ecuador, the Court found that Ecuador violated article 6 when it
failed to initiate formal investigations after complaints of maltreatment of
prisoners. 204
5.

Publicists
106. Publicists have also analysed these treaty obligations concerning prevention.
With respect to the general obligation to prevent, a central focus of recent
scholarship has been the 2007 judgment of the International Court of Justice in
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro). 205 Owing to the
absence of an express statement in the Genocide Convention that States parties shall
not commit genocide, some scholars have debated whether the Court was correct in
maintaining that the obligation is implicit in the obligation to “prevent”. 206
Reflecting on a judgment in which he participated, however, former Judge Bruno
Simma has indicated: “One of the more interesting questions finally put to rest in
the 2007 judgment concerned whether States parties to the Convention are
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Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), paras. 166, 174–75; see also
Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment (Ser. C), no. 99, para. 137,
142 (2003); see also Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment
(Ser. C), no. 110, para. 155 (2004) (finding that the State’s failure to effectively investigate
allegations of torture and leaving acts unpunished meant that they had failed to take effective
measures to prevent such acts from occurring, in violation of its obligations un der the provisions
of Article 6 of the Inter-American Torture Convention).
Tibi v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment (Ser. C) No. 114, para. 159 (2004); see also
Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judgment (Ser. C) No. 110, para. 155
(2004).
See, e.g., M. Piqué, “Beyond Territory, Jurisdiction, and Control: Towards a Comprehensive
Obligation to Prevent Crimes Against Humanity,” in Bergsmo & Song, supra note 7, p. 135;
T. Weber, “The Obligation to Prevent in the Proposed Convention Examined in Light of the
Obligation to Prevent in the Genocide Convention, ibid., p. 173.
Compare P. Gaeta, “On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible for Genocide?, ”
European J. Int’l L., vol. 18, p. 631 (2007), with C. Tams, “Article I,” in Tams et al., supra
note 140, at 56-60; A. Seibert-Fohr, “The ICJ Judgment in the ‘Bosnian Genocide’ Case and
Beyond: A Need to Reconceptualise?,” in Safferling & Conze, (eds.), The Genocide Convention
Sixty Years After its Adoption, p. 245 (Asser 2010).
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themselves under an obligation not to commit genocide. The Court ’s answer is a
clear ‘yes’.” 207
107. With respect to the obligation to pursue specific measures of prevention,
publicists tend to characterize the obligation as an obligation of conduct or means.
Thus,
in relation to an obligation of means, the State may be bound to take positive
measures of prevention or protection in order to obtain a particular goal ….
The expressions used vary from one treaty to another (“take all measures”, “all
appropriate measures to protect”, “necessary measures”, “effective measures”,
“appropriate measures”, “do everything possible”, “do everything in its
power”, “exercise due diligence”), but their common feature is their general
formulation and their lack of precise stipulation of the means to achieve the
specified result. 208
108. Other publicists have focused on the obligation to prevent as it exists in
particular treaties, such as article I of the Genocide Convention 209 or article 2(1) of
the Convention against Torture. For example, two participants in the drafting of
article 2(1) of the Convention against Torture have analysed it as follows:
According to paragraph 1 of the article, … each State party shall take effective
measures to prevent torture. The character of these measures is left to the
discretion of the State concerned. It is merely indicated that the measures may
be legislative, administrative, judicial or of some other kind, but in any case
they must be effective. The paragraph should also be compared with article 4
of the Convention, which specifically requires legislative measures in order to
make all acts of torture criminal offences punishable by appropriate penalties
which take into account their grave nature.
The obligation under article 2 is not only to prohibit but to prevent acts
of torture. This further emphasizes that the measures shall be effective: a
formal prohibition is not sufficient, but the acts shall actually be prevented.
This does not mean, of course, that a State can guarantee that no act of
torture will ever be committed in its territory. It is sufficient that the State does
what can reasonably be expected from it in order to prevent such acts from
occurring. If nevertheless such acts occur, other obligations under the
Convention become applicable, and the State may then be obliged under
article 2, paragraph 1, to take further effective measures in order to prevent a
repetition. Such measures may include changes of personne l in a certain unit,
stricter supervision, the issue of new instructions, etc. 210
__________________
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Simma, supra note 161, at 264.
C. Economides, supra note 192, at 378.
See, e.g., W. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, at 520-25
(Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 2009); C. Tams, “Article I,” in Tams et al., supra note 140,
at 45-54; O. Ben-Naftali, “The Obligation to Prevent and Punish Genocide,” in Gaeta, supra
note 140, p. 26, at 33-44.
J. Burgers and H. Danelius, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Handbook on the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
at 48, 123 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988) (Bergers, a member of the Netherlands delegation
to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, served as chairman of the working group charged
with drawing up the initial draft of the Convention; Danelius, a member of the Swedish
delegation, was a member of that working group and wrote the initial draft).
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109. Still other publicists have analysed the obligation to prevent as expressed in
case law. For example, one analysis of the Velasquez Rodriguez case finds:
The duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political,
administrative and cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights
and ensure that any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts, which,
as such, may lead to the punishment of those responsible and the obligation to
indemnify the victims for damages. The Court clarified, however, that while
the State is obligated to prevent human rights abuses, the existence of a
particular violation did not, in itself, prove the failure to take pr eventive
measures. On the other hand, subjecting a person to official, repressive bodies
that practiced torture and assassination with impunity was itself a breach of the
duty to prevent violations of the rights to life and physical integrity of the
person, even if that particular person was not tortured or assassinated, or if
those facts could not be proven in a concrete case. 211
110. Publicists appear to recognize that the obligation to pursue specific measures
to prevent does not actually dictate the specific steps that must be taken and instead
accepts that such steps may vary according to the nature of the conduct being
regulated and the context in which the State party is operating. Thus, one publicist
has analysed the obligation to prevent as expressed by treaty-monitoring bodies, in
case law, and in other sources so as to sketch out specific measures that should be
undertaken by a State party to the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Those measures included: (a) protective
measures to prevent the enforced disappearance of persons not in detention;
(b) safeguards surrounding arrest and detention to prevent subsequent enforced
disappearance; and (c) measures to prevent repetition of enforced disappeara nce of
persons when it occurs. 212

B.

Obligation to prevent and punish crimes against humanity
111. In light of the above, there appear to be three important elements that might be
captured in an initial draft article for a convention on crimes against h umanity. First,
the draft article could contain an opening provision that speaks generally to the
obligation of a State party both to prevent and to punish crimes against humanity.
Such a provision would signal at the outset the broad obligation being unde rtaken
by States parties with respect to the particular offence of crimes against humanity.
Second, the draft article could contain a further provision addressing the obligation
of the State party to pursue specific measures of prevention in the form of
appropriate legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures. Consistent with
prior treaties, this provision would only address the issue of prevention, since most
of the remainder of the convention on crimes against humanity will address in
greater detail specific measures that must be taken by the State party to punish
crimes against humanity, including the obligations to incorporate crimes against
humanity into national law and to exercise national jurisdiction over alleged
offenders. Finally, a third provision of the draft article could address the
non-derogable nature of the prohibition on crimes against humanity, an important
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Ramcharan, supra note 170, at 99. For an analysis of the “reasonableness” standard articulated
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statement at the outset of the convention that would highlight the seriousness of this
offence. Each of these elements is discussed below.
1.

General obligation to prevent and punish
112. Based on the prior treaty practice recounted above, there are various ways that
a general obligation to prevent and punish might be expressed in a convention on
crimes against humanity. The provisions contained in the 1948 Convention against
Genocide and the 1949 Geneva Conventions were early efforts at identifying such
an obligation. Even so, the approach in article I of the Genocide Convention —
“confirming” genocide to be a crime under international law and calling upon States
parties to pursue steps to prevent and punish such conduct — remains a useful
model for a general obligation in a convention to prevent crimes against humanity.
Again, that formulation is:
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of
peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they
undertake to prevent and to punish.
Using such a formulation would “confirm” that crimes against humanity currently
violate customary international law; would clearly confirm its historical
development as a crime that arises whether committed in time of peace or war; and
would generally presage what follows in subsequent provisions that call upon States
parties to take specific steps, such as adopting any necessary national criminal
legislation. Further, using such a formulation would help in harmonizing the present
draft articles with a widely-adhered-to convention on another core crime of
international law (as at January 2015, there are 146 States parties to the Genocide
Convention).
113. The words “undertake to” remain appropriate, given the analysis of the
International Court of Justice that “the ordinary meaning of the word ‘undertake’ is
to give a formal promise, to bind or engage oneself, to give a pledge or promise, to
agree, to accept an obligation”. 213 As discussed above, this obligation consists of
two types of obligations: (a) an obligation by the State not to commit such acts
through its own organs, or persons over whom they have control such that their
conduct is attributable to the State under international law; and (b) an obligation for
the State to employ the reasonable means at its disposal, when necessary,
appropriate and lawful, to prevent others not directly under its auth ority from
committing such acts. 214 The formulation contained in article I of the Genocide
Convention is not, by its terms, limited in geographic scope. As such, it prohibits a
State party from committing genocide outside territory under its jurisdiction, an d
imposes an obligation to act with respect to other actors outside such territory,
subject to the important parameters discussed above.

2.

Specific measures for prevention
114. At the same time, as noted above, an obligation exists in numerous treatie s
that requires States Parties to pursue specific types of measures to prevent the
crime. One widely-adhered-to formulation is found in article 2(1) of the 1984
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Convention against Torture (as at January 2015, 156 States have adhered to this
convention), which provides that:
Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or
other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its
jurisdiction. 215
115. During the drafting of the Convention against Torture, this language was
understood to provide flexibility and discretion to each State party as to the
character of the measures to be taken, so long as they promote the basic objectives
of the treaty. 216 By referring to acts occurring “in any territory under its
jurisdiction”, the language is broader than a reference solely to conduct occurring in
the State’s “territory”, 217 but narrower than language that could suggest an
obligation upon the State to develop legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent any conduct worldwide. “Territory under its jurisdiction”
includes sovereign territory, vessels and aircraft of the State ’s nationality and
occupied and other territory under its jurisdiction. 218 Such a geographic formulation
appears to be supported in many contemporary treaties in addition to the
Convention against Torture; 219 by establishing an obligation upon States to take
specific measures to prevent conduct “in territory under its jurisdiction”, the
language focuses the obligation on areas where the State has a day-to-day ability to
act and avoids suggesting a more open-ended and therefore perhaps less clear
obligation with respect to the adoption of specific measures.
116. As noted above, the specific measures that must be taken will depend in part
on the context and risks at issue for any given State party. Nevertheless, such an
obligation normally would oblige the State party to: (a) adopt national laws,
institutions and policies necessary to establish awareness of the criminality of the
act and to promote early detection of any risk of its commission; (b) continually to
keep those laws and policies under review and as necessary improve them;
(c) pursue initiatives that educate governmental officials as to the State ’s obligations
under the convention; (d) develop training programmes for police, military, militia
and other relevant personnel as necessary to help prevent the commission of crimes
against humanity; and (e) once the proscribed act is committed, fulfil in good faith
other obligations within the convention that require the State party to investigate
and either prosecute or extradite offenders, since doing so serves, in part, to deter
__________________
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Article 2(3) provides: “An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be
invoked as a justification of torture.” The issue raised by this provision will be addressed in a
future report of the Special Rapporteur in the context of the State Party ’s obligation to ensure
that a crime against humanity constitutes an offence under its criminal law.
See ibid.
See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, art. 4(1), Dec. 14, 1973, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 (obliging States to take “all
practicable measures to prevent preparations in their respective territories for the commission
of” offences); Convention against the Taking of Hostages, art. 4(1), Dec. 17, 1979, 1316
U.N.T.S. 205 (same); Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,
art. 11(a), Dec. 9, 1994, 2051 U.N.T.S. 363 (same).
Nowak and McArthur, supra note 171, at 116-17.
See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, art. 3, Dec. 21,
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (obliging States to “undertake to prevent … all practices of this nature
in territories under their jurisdiction”); Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
torture), art. 6, O.A.S. Official Records OAS/Ser.L.V.1.4, Doc. 67, Rev. 9 (Dec. 9, 1985
(obliging States to “take effective measures to prevent … torture within their jurisdiction ”).
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future acts by others. Such measures, of course, may already be in place for most
States, since the underlying wrongful acts associated with crimes against humanity
(murder, torture, etc.) are already proscribed in most national legal systems.
117. The general and more specific obligations to prevent crimes against humanity
on the basis of the above-quoted texts would build upon obligations that already
exist to prevent the underlying wrongful acts from occurring even on an isolated
basis. When combining them in a single draft article, the texts might be harmonized
by referring to “Each State Party” (used in the Convention against Torture) rather
than “The Contracting Parties” (used in the Genocide Convention).
3.

Non-derogation provision
118. As previously noted, general and specific obligations on prevention are often
accompanied by a further provision indicating that no exceptional circumstances
(such as the existence of an armed conflict or a public emergency) may be invoked
as a justification for the offence. Such a general statement is often placed at the
outset of the treaty that addresses serious crimes, which ha s the advantage of
stressing that the obligation not to commit the offence is non -derogable in nature.
119. For example, article 2(2) of the Convention against Torture makes clear that
no exceptional situation may be invoked to justify acts of torture; hen ce, the
obligation set forth is non-derogable in nature. 220 Specifically, that paragraph
provides:
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of torture. 221
Comparable language may be found in other treaties addressing serious crimes at
the global or regional level. For example, article 1(2) of the 2006 International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced D isappearance contains
the same language, while article 5 of the 1985 Inter-American Convention to
Prevent and Punish Torture contains comparable language. One advantage of this
formulation with respect to crimes against humanity is that it is drafted in a manner
that can speak to the conduct of either State or non-State actors.
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C.

Draft article 1: Preventing and punishing crimes against humanity
120. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the
following draft article:
Draft article 1
Prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity
1.
Each State Party confirms that crimes against humanity, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, are crimes under international
law which it undertakes to prevent and punish.
2.
Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent crimes against humanity in any territory
under its jurisdiction.
3.
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or
a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency,
may be invoked as a justification of crimes against humanity.

VI. Definition of crimes against humanity
121. As indicated in section III above, the definition of crimes agains t humanity has
been the subject of different formulations over the past century. The most widely
accepted formulation, however, is that of article 7 of the Rome Statute, which was
built upon the formulations articulated in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, the
Nuremberg Principles, the 1954 draft Code of Offences against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, the 1993 statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia , the 1994 statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the
1994 draft statute for an international criminal court, of the International Law
Commission, and the Commission’s 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace
and Security of Mankind. Article 7 of the Rome Statute reflects an agreement
reached among the 122 States that were parties to the statute as at January 2015.
122. While from time to time the view is expressed that article 7 might be
improved, and although disagreements may exist regarding whether it reflects
customary international law 222 or what constitutes the best interpretation of some of
its aspects, 223 there can be little doubt that article 7 has very broad support among
States as a definition of crimes against humanity. Indeed, every State that addressed
this issue before the Sixth Committee in the fall o f 2014 maintained that the
__________________
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See, e.g., A. Cassese, “Crimes against Humanity,” supra note 37, at 375. For example, while a
“policy” element appears in Article 7, the ICTY Appeals Chamber maintained in 2002 in the
Kunarac case that there is “nothing” in customary international law that requires a policy
element and, rather, an “overwhelming” case against it. Kunarac 2002, para. 98; see also
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number of States to the Rome Statute, it seems likely that Article 7 is having an effect in
crystalizing customary international law. See generally R. Baxter, “Multilateral Treaties as
Evidence of Customary International Law”, British Yearbook of Int’l L., vol. 41 (1965), p. 275.
See, e.g., D. Robinson, “The Draft Convention on Crimes Against Humanity: What to Do with
the Definition?,” in Bergsmo & Song, supra note 7, at 103, 105 (but concluding that “the
arguments for crafting a new definition are widely seen to be outweighed by the benefits of
using the established definition in Article 7” of the Rome Statute).

57/88

A/CN.4/680

Commission should not adopt a definition of “crimes against humanity” for a new
convention that differs from article 7 of the Rome Statute. 224 Moreover, any
convention that seeks in part to promote the complementarity regime of the Rome
Statute should use the article 7 definition so as to foster national laws that are in
harmony with the Rome Statute. More generally, using the article 7 definition would
help minimize undesirable fragmentation in the field of international criminal l aw.
123. Article 7 of the Rome Statute provides:
Article 7
Crimes against humanity
1.
For the purpose of this Statute, “crimes against humanity” means
any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of
the attack:
(a)

Murder;

(b)

Extermination;

(c)

Enslavement;

(d)

Deportation or forcible transfer of population;

(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(f)

Torture;

(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible
under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this
paragraph or in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i)

Enforced disappearance of persons;

(j)

The crime of apartheid;

(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
__________________
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2.

For the purpose of paragraph 1:

(a)
“Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course
of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragrap h 1
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack;
(b) “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of
life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to
bring about the destruction of part of a population;
(c) “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of
such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and
children;
(d) “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts
from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted
under international law;
(e) “Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under
the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pai n or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;
(f) “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of
any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This
definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws
relating to pregnancy;
(g) “Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of
the group or collectivity;
(h) “The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a character
similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial
group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention
of maintaining that regime;
(i) “Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
those persons, with the intention of removing them from the pro tection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
3.
For the purposes of this Statute, it is understood that the term
“gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of
society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the
above.
124. As noted in section III above, early definitions of crimes against humanity
required that the underlying acts be accomplished in connection with armed
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conflict, most likely in part to address concerns about whether the crime was wellsettled in international law, and in part to distinguish international crimes from
large-scale, violent national crimes. 225 While the statute of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia maintained the armed conflict connection
because that statute was crafted in the context of such a conflict, since 1993 that
connection has disappeared from the statutes of international criminal tribunals,
including the Rome Statute. 226 In its place are the “chapeau” requirements that the
crime be committed within the context of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against a civilian population in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such an attack.

A.

“Widespread or systematic” attack
125. The requirement that there be a “widespread or systematic attack” first
appeared in the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 227 though
some decisions of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia maintained
that the requirement was implicit even in the that court ’s statute, given the inclusion
of such language in the report of the Secretary-General proposing the statute. 228
Jurisprudence of both courts maintained that the conditions of “widespread” and
“systematic” were disjunctive rather than conjunctive requirements; either condition
may be met to establish the existence of the crime. 229 For example, the Trial
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the case Prosecutor
v. Akayesu found: “The act can be part of a widespread or systematic attack and
need not be a part of both.” 230 This reading of the widespread/systematic
requirement is also reflected in the Commission’s commentary to the 1996 draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, where it stated that “an
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Ambos & Wirth, supra note 99, at 3–13.
See infra Part II. Unlike the English version the French version of Article 3 the ICTR Statute
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See, e.g., Akayesu 1998, para. 579; Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Trial Chamber, Judgment, Case
No. ICTR-95-1, para. 123 (May 21, 1999) (hereinafter Kayishema 1999) (“The attack must
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Mrkšić, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-95-13/1, para. 437 (Sept. 27, 2007)
(hereinafter Mrkšić 2007) (“[T]he attack must be widespread or systematic, the requirement
being disjunctive rather than cumulative”); Tadić 1997, para. 648 (“[E]ither a finding of
widespreadness…or systematicity…fulfills this requirement.”).
Akayesu 1998, para. 579.
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act could constitute a crime against humanity if either of these conditions [of
systematicity or scale] is met”. 231
126. When this standard was considered for the Rome Statute, some States
expressed the view that the conditions of “widespread” and “systematic” should be
conjunctive requirements — that they both should be present to establish the
existence of the crime — because otherwise the standard would be overinclusive. 232
Indeed, if “widespread” commission of acts alone were sufficient, these States
maintained that spontaneous waves of widespread, but unrelated, crimes would
constitute crimes against humanity. 233 Owing to that concern, a compromise was
developed that involved adding to article 7(2)(a) a definition of “attack” which, as
discussed below, contains a policy element. 234
127. Case law of the International Criminal Court has affirmed that the conditions
of “widespread” and “systematic” are disjunctive. For example, in its Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (hereinafter Kenya Authorization
Decision 2010), Pre-Trial Chamber II of the Court stated that “this contextual
element [of widespread or systematic] applies disjunctively, such that the alleged
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Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty -eighth session, Yearbook of
the International Law Commission, 1996, vol. II (Part Two), at 47 (hereinafter “1996 ILC
Report”). See also Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent
International Criminal Court, GAOR, 50 th Session Supplement No. 22, U.N. Doc. A/50/22, at
17 (1995) (hereinafter “1995 Ad Hoc Comm. Report”) (“elements that should be reflected in the
definition of crimes against humanity included…[that] the crimes usually involved a widespread
or systematic attack”) (emphasis added); Report of the International Law Commission on the
work of its forty-seventh session, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1995, vol. II
(Part Two), at 25 (hereinafter “1995 ILC report”) (“the concepts of ‘systematic’ and ‘massive’
violations were complementary elements of the crimes concerned ”); Report of the International
Law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1994, vol. II (Part Two), at 40 (hereinafter “1994 ILC Report”) (“the definition of
crimes against humanity encompasses inhumane acts of a very serious character involving
widespread or systematic violations”) (emphasis added); Report of the International Law
Commission on the work of its forty-third session, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1991, vol. II (Part Two) at 103 (hereinafter “1991 ILC Report”) (“[e]ither one of
these aspects — systematic or mass scale — in any of the acts enumerated … is enough for the
offence to have taken place”).
See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishm ent of an
International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II), at 148 (India), at 150 (United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France), at 151 (Thailand, Egypt), at 152 (Islamic
Republic of Iran), at 154 (Turkey), at 155 (Russian Federation), at 156 (Japan); B. Van Schaack,
“The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence,” Columbia J. of
Transnat’l L., vol. 37, at 787, 844 (1999).
D. Robinson, “Defining Crimes against Humanity at the Rome Conference,” supra note 90, at
47.
P. Hwang, “Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court,” Fordham Int’l L. J., vol. 22, at 457, 497 (1998); M. deGuzman, “The Road
from Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes Against Humanity”, Human Rights Quarterly,
vol. 22, at 335, 372 (2000) (citing the author ’s notes of debate, Committee of the Whole
(June 17, 1998), taken while the author was a legal advisor on the delegation of Senegal to
the Rome Conference); Van Schaack, supra note 37, at 844-45.
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acts must be either widespread or systematic to warrant classification as crimes
against humanity”. 235
128. The first condition requires that the attack be “widespread”. According to the
Trial Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Kunarac,
“the adjective ‘widespread’ connotes the large-scale nature of the attack and the
number of targeted persons”. 236 As such, this requirement refers to a “multiplicity
of victims” 237 and excludes isolated acts of violence, 238 such as murder directed
against individual victims by persons acting on their own volition rather than as part
of a broader initiative. At the same time, a single act committed by an individual
perpetrator can constitute a crime against humanity if it occurs within the context of
a broader campaign. 239 There is no specific numerical threshold of victims that must
be met for an attack to be “widespread”; rather, the determination is dependent on
the size of the civilian population that was allegedly attacked. 240 For example, in
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia identified the following test for determining whether an attack is
widespread:
A Trial Chamber must therefore “first identify the population which is the
object of the attack and, in light of the means, methods, resources and result of
the attack upon the population, ascertain whether the attack was indeed
widespread ...” The consequences of the attack upon the targeted population,
the number of victims, the nature of the acts … could be taken into account to
determine whether the attack satisfies either or both requirements of a
“widespread” or “systematic” attack vis-à-vis this civilian population. 241
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See Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Pre-Trial Chamber, ICC-01/09, para. 94 (Mar. 31, 2010)
(hereinafter Kenya Authorization Decision 2010) (emphasis in original); see also Prosecutor v.
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b)
of the Rome Statute on the Charges, ICC-01/05-01/08, para. 82 (June 15, 2009) (hereinafter
Bemba 2009).
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23, para. 428 (Feb. 22,
2001) (Kunarac 2001); see Prosecutor v. Katanga, Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/07, para. 394 (Sept. 30, 2008) (hereinafter Katanga
2008); see also Prosecutor v. Kordić and Ćerkez, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, IT-95-14/2-A,
para. 94 (Dec. 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Jokić, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTY
Case No. IT-02-60-T, para. 545-46 (Jan. 17, 2005).
Bemba 2009, para. 83; 1996 ILC Report, at 47 (using the phrase “on a large scale” instead of
widespread); Akayesu 1998, para. 580; Kayishema 1999, para. 123; see also Mrkšić 2007,
para. 437 (“widespread refers to the large scale nature of the attack and the number of victims ”).
See Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Prosecutor ’s
Application under Article 58, ICC-01/04-02/06, para. 19 (July 13, 2012) (hereinafter Ntaganda
2012); Prosecutor v. Harun, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Prosecution Application
under Article 58(7) of the Statute, ICC-02/05-01/07, para. 62 (Apr. 27, 2007) (hereinafter Harun
2007); see also Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTR-96-3-T, para. 67-69
(Dec. 6, 1999); Kayishema 1999, paras. 122-23; 1996 ILC Report, at 47; 1991 ILC Report, at 103.
Kupreškić 2000, para. 550; Tadić 1997, para. 649.
See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23, para. 95
(June 12, 2002) (hereinafter Kunarac 2002).
Ibid. (citations omitted).

15-02139

A/CN.4/680

129. “Widespread” can also have a geographical dimension, with the attack
occurring in different locations. 242 Thus, in the Bemba case, Pre-Trial Chamber II of
the International Criminal Court found that there was sufficient evidence to
establish that an attack was “widespread” on the basis of reports of attacks in
various locations over a large geographical area, including evidence of thousands of
rapes, mass grave sites and a large number of victims. 243 Yet a large geographic area
is not required; the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has found that
the attack can be in a small geographic area against a large number of civilians. 244
130. In its Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the
International Criminal Court indicated that “[t]he assessment is neither exclusively
quantitative nor geographical, but must be carried out on the basis of the individual
facts”. 245 An attack may be widespread owing to the cumulative effect of multiple
inhumane acts or the result of a single inhumane act of great magnitude. 246
131. The second, alternative condition requires that the attack be “systematic”. In
its commentary to the 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, the Commission stated that the requirement of “systematic” means that
the inhumane acts are committed “pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy” and
that the “implementation of this plan or policy could result in the repeated or
continuous commission of inhuman acts”. 247 Like “widespread”, the term
“systematic” excludes isolated or unconnected acts of violence, 248 and
jurisprudence from the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Court
reflects a similar understanding of what is meant by the term. The International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia defined “systematic” as “the organized nature of
the acts of violence and the improbability of their random occurrence ” 249 and found
that evidence of a pattern or methodical plan establishes that an attack was
systematic. 250 Thus, the Appeals Chamber in Kunarac confirmed that “patterns of
crimes — that is the non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a
regular basis — are a common expression of such systematic occurrence”. 251 The
Trial Chamber in Kunarac found that there was a systematic attack on the Muslim
civilian population on the basis of evidence of a consistent pattern: once the Serb
forces had control of a town or village, they would ransack or burn down Muslim
apartments or houses; they would then round up or capture Muslim villagers, who
were sometimes beaten or killed during the process; and the men and women would
__________________
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See, e.g., Ntaganda 2012, para. 30; Prosecutor v. Ruto, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute,
ICC-01/09-01/11, para. 177 (Jan. 23, 2012) (hereinafter Ruto 2012).
Bemba 2009, paras. 117-124.
Blaškić 2000, para. 206; Prosecutor v. Kordić and Ćerkez, Appeals Chamber, Judgment, ICTY
Case No. IT-95-14-/2-A, para. 94 (Dec. 17, 2004) (hereinafter Kordić 2004).
Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 95.
1996 ILC Report, at 47; see also Bemba 2009, para. 83 (finding that widespread “entails an
attack carried out over a large geographical area or an attack in a small geographical area
directed against a large number of civilians.”).
1996 ILC Report, at 47; see also 1991 ILC Report, at 103 (“The systematic element relates to a
constant practice or to a methodical plan to carry out such violations. ”).
See 1996 ILC Report, at 47; 1991 ILC Report, at 103.
Mrkšić 2007, para. 437; Kunarac 2001, para. 429.
See, e.g., Tadić 1997, para. 648.
Kunarac 2002, para. 94.
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be separated and kept in various detention centres or prisons. 252 Likewise, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda has defined “systematic” as organized
conduct following a consistent pattern or pursuant to a policy or plan. 253
132. Consistent with jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Pre -Trial Chamber I
of the International Criminal Court found in Harun that “‘systematic’ refers to ‘the
organized nature of the acts of violence and improbability of their random
occurrence’”. 254 Pre-Trial Chamber I found in Katanga that the term “has been
understood as either an organized plan in furtherance of a common p olicy, which
follows a regular pattern and results in a continuous commission of acts, or as
‘patterns of crimes’ such that the crimes constitute a ‘non-accidental repetition of
similar criminal conduct on a regular basis’”. 255 In applying the standard in
Ntaganda, Pre-Trial Chamber II found an attack to be systematic since “the
perpetrators employed similar means and methods to attack the different locations:
they approached the targets simultaneously, in large numbers, and from different
directions, they attacked villages with heavy weapons, and systematically chased
the population by similar methods, hunting house by house and into the bushes,
burning all properties and looting”. 256

B.

“Directed against any civilian population”
133. The second general requirement of article 7 of the Rome Statute is that the act
must be committed as part of an attack “directed against any civilian population”.
Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute defines “attack directed against any civilian
population” for the purpose of paragraph 1 as “a course of conduct involving the
multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack”. 257 Moreover, jurisprudence from the International Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the
International Criminal Court has construed the meaning of each of those terms:
“directed against”, “any”, “civilian” and “population”.
134. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has established that the
phrase “directed against” requires that a civilian population be the intended primary
target of the attack, rather than an incidental victim. 258 Pre-Trial Chamber II of the
International Criminal Court subsequently adopted this interpretation in the Bemba
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Kunarac 2001, paras. 573, 578.
Akayesu 1998, para. 580 (“systematic may be defined as thoroughly organized and following a
regular pattern on the basis of a common policy”); Kayishema 1999, para. 123 (“systematic
attacks means an attack carried out pursuant to a preconceived policy or plan ”).
Harun 2007, para. 62 (citing to Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Appeal Judgment, Case
No. IT-95-14/2-A, para. 94 (Dec. 17, 2004), which in turn cites to Kunarac 2001, para. 429);
see also Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 96; Ruto 2012, para. 179; Katanga 2008,
para. 394.
Katanga 2008, para. 397.
Ntaganda 2012, para. 31; see also Ruto 2012, para. 179.
See also ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 5.
See, e.g., Kunarac 2001, para. 421 (“The expression ‘directed against’ specifies that in the
context of a crime against humanity the civilian population is the primary obj ect of the attack.”).
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case and the Kenya Authorization Decision 2010. 259 In the Bemba case, the
Chamber found that there was sufficient evidence showing the attack was “directed
against” the civilian population of the Central African Republic. 260 The Chamber
concluded that Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) soldiers were
aware that their victims were civilians, based on direct evidence of civilians being
attacked inside their houses or in their courtyards. 261 The Chamber further found
that MLC soldiers targeted primarily the civilian population, demonstrated by an
attack at one locality where the MLC soldiers did not find any rebel troops that they
claimed to be chasing. 262 The term “directed” places its emphasis on the intention
of the attack rather than the physical result of the attack. 263 It is the attack, not the
acts of the individual perpetrator, which must be “directed against” the target
population. 264
135. The word “any” indicates that “civilian population” is to have a wide
definition and should be interpreted broadly. 265 An attack can be committed against
any civilian population, “regardless of their nationality, ethnicity or any other
distinguishing feature”, 266 and can be committed against either national or foreign
populations. 267 Those targeted may “include a group defined by its (perceived)
political affiliation”. 268 In order to qualify as a civilian population during a time of
armed conflict, the targeted population must be of a “predominantly” civilian
nature; 269 the presence of certain combatants within the population does not change
its character. 270 This approach is in accordance with other rules arising under
international humanitarian law. For example, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions states: “The presence within the civilian population of individuals who
do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its
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Bemba 2009, para. 76; Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 82.
Bemba 2009, para. 94; see also Ntaganda 2012, paras. 20-21.
Bemba 2009, para. 94.
Ibid., paras. 95-98. The Pre-Trial Chamber also relied on evidence that at the time of the arrival
of the MLC soldiers in this locality, rebel troops had already withdrawn. Ibid., para. 98.
See, e.g., Blaškić 2000, n. 401.
Kunarac 2002, para. 103.
See, e.g., Mrkšić 2007, para. 442; Tadić 1997, para. 643; Kupreškić 2000, para. 547 (“[A] wide
definition of civilian and population is intended. This is warranted first of all by the object and
purpose of the general principles and rules of humanitarian law, in particular by the rules
prohibiting crimes against humanity.”); Kayishema 1999, para. 127.
Katanga 2008, para. 399 (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, Trial Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1,
para. 635 (May 7, 2991)).
See, e.g., Kunarac 2001, para. 423.
Ruto 2012, para. 164.
See, e.g., Mrkšić 2007, para. 442; Tadić 1997, para. 638; Kunarac 2001, para. 425; Kordić 2001,
para. 180; Kayishema 1999, para. 128.
See, e.g., Mrkšić 2007, para. 442; Tadić 1997, para. 638; Kunarac 2001, para. 425 (“the
presence of certain non-civilians in its midst does not change the character of the population”);
Blaškić 2000, para. 214 (“the presence of soldiers within an intentionally targeted civilian
population does not alter the civilian nature of that population ”); Kupreškić 2000, para. 549
(“the presence of those actively involved in the conflict should not prevent the characterization
a population as civilian”); Kordić 2001, para. 180; Akayesu 1998, para. 582 (“Where there are
certain individuals within the civilian population who do not come within the definition of
civilians, this does not deprive the population of its civilian character. ”); Kayishema 1999,
para. 128.
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civilian character.” 271 During a time of peace, “civilian” shall include all persons
except those individuals who have a duty to maintain public order and have
legitimate means to exercise force to that end at the time they are being attacked. 272
The status of any given victim must be assessed at the time the offence is
committed; 273 a person should be considered a civilian if there is a doubt as to his
or her status. 274
136. “Population” does not mean that the entire population of a given geographical
location must be subject to the attack; 275 rather, the term implies the collective
nature of the crime as an attack upon multiple victims. 276 Any particular victim
must be targeted not because of his or her individual characteristics, but because of
his or her membership in a targeted civilian population. 277 International Criminal
Court decisions in the Bemba case and the Kenya Authorization Decision 2010 have
adopted a similar approach, declaring that the Prosecutor must establish that the
attack was directed against the population, rather than a limited group of
individuals. 278
137. Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute defines “attack directed against any
civilian population” for the purpose of paragraph 1. The first part of this definition
refers to “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to
in paragraph 1 against any civilian population”. Although no such language was
contained in the statutory definition of crimes against humanity for the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, this language reflects jurisprudence from both t hese tribunals. 279 The
Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court provides that the “acts”
referred to in article 7(2)(a) “need not constitute a military attack”. 280
__________________
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Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 50(3), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
Kayishema 1999, para. 127.
Blaškić 2000, para. 214 (“[T]he specific situation of the victim at the moment the crimes were
committed, rather than his status, must be taken into account in determining his standing as a
civilian.”); see also Kordić 2001, para. 180 (“[I]ndividuals who at one time performed acts of
resistance may in certain circumstances be victims of a crime against humanity. ”); Akayesu
1998, para. 582 (finding that civilian population includes “members of the armed forces who
laid down their arms and those persons placed hors de combat”).
Kunarac 2001, para. 426.
See Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 82; Bemba 2009, para. 77; Kunarac 2001,
para. 424; Tadić 1997, para. 644; see also 1994 ILC Report, at 40 (defining crimes against
humanity as “inhumane acts of a very serious character involving widespread or systematic
violations aimed at the civilian population in whole or in part”) (emphasis added).
See Tadić 1997, para. 644.
Ibid.; see also Kunarac 2001, para. 90; Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Trial Chamber, Judgment, ICTY
Case No. IT-06-90-T, para. 1704 (Apr. 15, 2011) (finding that the attack must be directed at a
civilian population, “rather than against a limited and randomly selected number of individuals”).
Bemba 2009, para. 77; Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 81.
See, e.g., Kunarac 2001, para. 415 (defining attack as “a course of conduct involving the
commission of acts of violence”); Kayishema 1999, para. 122 (defining attack as the “event in
which the enumerated crimes must form part”); Akayesu 1998, para. 581 (“The concept of attack
may be defined as a unlawful act of the kind enumerated [in the Statute]. An attack may also b e
nonviolent in nature, like imposing a system of apartheid ... or exerting pressure on the
population to act in a particular manner …”).
ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 5.
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138. The second part of this definition requires that the attack be “pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack ”. The
requirement of a policy element did not appear as part of the definition of crimes
against humanity in the statutes of international tribunals until the adoption of the
Rome Statute. 281 The statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda contain no policy
requirement in their definition of crimes against humanity, 282 although some early
jurisprudence required it. 283 Later jurisprudence, however, downplayed the policy
element, regarding it as sufficient simply to prove the existence of a widespread or
systematic attack. 284
139. Prior to the Rome Statute, the work of the International Law Commission in its
draft codes tended to require a policy element. The Commission ’s 1954 draft Code
of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind defined crimes against
humanity as “Inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation
or persecutions, committed against any civilian population on social, political, racial
or cultural grounds by the authorities of a State or by private individuals acting at
the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities ”. 285 The Commission
decided to include the State instigation or tolerance requirement in order to exclude
inhuman acts committed by private persons on their own without any State
involvement. 286 At the same time, the definition of crimes against humanity
included in the 1954 draft code did not include any req uirement of scale
(“widespread”) or systematicity.
__________________
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Article 6(c) of the Nürnberg Charter contains no explicit refere nce to a plan or policy. The
Nürnberg Judgment, however, did use a “policy” descriptor when discussing article 6(c) in the
context of the concept of the “attack” as a whole. See IMT, Judgment (Oct. 1, 1946), in The
Trial of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal
sitting at Nürnberg, Germany, Part 22, at 468 (Aug. 22, 1946 to Oct. 1, 1946) (“The policy of
terror was certainly carried out on a vast scale, and in many cases was organized and systematic.
The policy of persecution, repression and murder of civilians in Germany before the war of
1939, who were likely to be hostile to the Government, was most ruthlessly carried out. ”)
Article II(1)(c) of Control Council Law No. 10 also contains no reference to a plan or polic y in
its definition of crimes against humanity. See generally G. Mettraux, “The Definition of Crimes
Against Humanity and the Question of a ‘Policy’ Element, in L. Sadat (ed.), Forging a
Convention for Crimes against Humanity, supra note 7, at 142.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber has determined that there is no policy element on crimes against
humanity in customary international law, see Kunarac 2002, para. 98 (“There was nothing in the
Statute or in customary international law at the time of the alleged acts which required proof of
the existence of a plan or policy to commit these crimes.”), although that position that has been
criticized in writings. See, e.g., W. Schabas, “State Policy as an Element of International
Crimes,” 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology, vol. 98, p. 953, at 954 (2008).
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1, paras. 644, 653-55, 626 (May 7, 1997)
(“‘directed against a civilian population’” … requires that the acts be undertaken on a
widespread or systematic basis and in furtherance of a policy.”(emphasis added)).
See, e.g., Kordić 2001, para. 182 (finding that “the existence of a plan or policy should better be
regarded as indicative of the systematic character of offences charged as crimes against
humanity”); Kunarac 2002, para. 98; Akayesu 1998, para. 580; Kayishema 1999, para. 124 (“For
an act of mass victimisation to be a crime against humanity, it must include a policy element.
Either of the requirements of widespread or systematic are enough to exclude acts not
committed as part of a broader policy or plan.”).
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixth session, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 1954, vol. II, at 150 (hereinafter “1954 ILC Report”) (emphasis
added).
Ibid., at 150.
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140. The Commission’s 1994 draft statute for an international criminal court did not
contain a definition of crimes against humanity. Rather, the draft statute referenced
the definitions in article 5 of the statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and article 21 of the 1991 draft code of crimes against the peace and
security of mankind, neither of which contained a State policy requirement. 287 Even
so, the Commission did mention the issue of policy when it stated: “The particular
forms of unlawful act … are less crucial to the definition than the facts of scale and
deliberate policy, as well as in their being targeted against the civilian population in
whole or in part.” 288 The Commission’s 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the
Peace and Security of Mankind also recognized a policy requirement, defining
crimes against humanity as “any of the following acts, when committed in a
systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or
by an organization or group”. 289 The Commission included this requirement in
order to exclude inhumane acts committed by an individual “acting on his own
initiative pursuant to his own criminal plan in the absence of any encouragement or
direction from either a Government or a group or organization ”. 290 In other words,
the policy element sought to exclude “ordinary” crimes of individuals acting on
their own initiative and without any connection to a State or organization. 291
141. Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute uses the “policy” element in its definition
of an “attack directed against any civilian population”. The International Criminal
Court’s Elements of Crimes further provides that “policy to commit such attack”
requires that “the State or organization actively promote or encourage such an attack
against a civilian population”. 292 In a footnote, Elements of Crimes provides that “a
policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to
take action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack”. 293 Other
precedents also emphasize that deliberate failure to act can satisfy the policy
element. 294
142. This “policy” element has been addressed in several cases at the International
Criminal Court. 295 For example, in its Kenya Authorization Decision 2010,
Pre-Trial Chamber II of the Court suggested that the meaning of “State” in article
7(a)(2) is “self-explanatory”. 296 The Chamber went on to note that a policy adopted
by regional or local organs of the State could satisfy the requirement of State
policy. 297 Judge Hans-Peter Kaul argued in his dissent that, while acts of regional or
__________________
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1994 ILC Report, at 40.
Ibid.
1996 ILC Report, at 47 (emphasis added).
Ibid. In explaining its inclusion of the policy requirement, the Commission notes “It would be
extremely difficult for a single individual acting alone to commit the in humane acts as
envisaged in article 18.”
See M.C. Bassiouni, “Revisiting the Architecture of Crimes Against Humanity: Almost a
Century in the Making, with Gaps and Ambiguities Remaining — the Need for a Specialized
Convention,” in Forging a Convention, supra note 7, at 54-55.
ICC, Elements of Crimes, supra note 92, at 5.
Ibid.
Kupreškić 2000, paras. 551-55 (“approved,” “condoned,” “explicit or implicit approval”); 1954
ILC Draft Code (“toleration”); Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, para. 85 (27 May 1994); Ambos
& Wirth, supra note 99, at 31-34.
See, e.g., Ntaganda 2012, para. 24; Katanga 2008, para. 396; Bemba 2009, para. 81.
Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, para. 89.
Ibid.
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local organs could be imputed to the State, nevertheless “considerations of
attribution do not answer the question of who can establish a Sta te policy”. 298 Even
so, he found that, “considering the specific circumstances of the case, a policy may
also be adopted by an organ which, albeit at the regional level, such as the highest
official or regional government in a province, has the means to esta blish a policy
within its sphere of action”. 299
143. In its Katanga 2014 decision, Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal
Court found that the policy need not be formally established or promulgated in
advance of the attack, and can be deduced from the repetition of acts, from
preparatory activities or from a collective mobilization. 300 Moreover, the policy
need not be concrete or precise, and may evolve over time as circumstances
unfold. 301 The Trial Chamber stressed that the policy requirement should not be
seen as synonymous with “systematic”, since doing so would contradict the
disjunctive requirement in article 7 of a “widespread” or “systematic” attack. 302
Rather, while “systematic” refers to a repetitive scheme of acts with similar
features, the “policy” requirement points more toward such acts being intended as a
collective attack on the civilian population. 303
144. In its decision confirming the indictment of Laurent Gbagbo, Pre -Trial
Chamber I of the International Criminal Court found that
the “policy”, for the purposes of the Statute, must be understood as the active
promotion or encouragement of an attack against a civilian population by a
State or organisation. The Chamber observes that neither the Statute nor the
Elements of Crimes include a certain rationale or motivations of the policy as
a requirement of the definition. Establishing the underlying motive may,
however, be useful for the detection of common features and links between
acts. Furthermore, in accordance with the Statute and the Element s of Crimes,
it is only necessary to establish that the person had knowledge of the attack in
general terms. Indeed, the Elements of Crimes clarify that the requirement of
knowledge “should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator
had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise details of the
plan or policy of the State or organization”. 304
In the Bemba case, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court found
that the attack was pursuant to an organizational policy on the basis of evidence
__________________
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establishing that the MLC troops “carried out attacks following the same
pattern”. 305 Such decisions are being thoughtfully analysed in the scholarly
literature. 306

C.

Non-State actors
145. The Commission, commenting in 1991 on the draft provision on crimes
against humanity for what would become the 1996 draft code of crimes, stated that
“the draft article does not confine possible perpetrators of the crimes to public
officials or representatives alone” and that it “does not rule out the possibility that
private individuals with de facto power or organized in criminal gangs or groups
might also commit the kind of systematic or mass violations of human rights
covered by the article; in that case, their acts would come under the d raft Code”. 307
Even so, a debate existed within the Commission with respect to this issue. The
1995 ILC Report discusses the debate, with some members taking the position that
the code should only apply to State actors and others favouring the inclusion of
non-State perpetrators. 308 As discussed previously, the 1996 Draft Code added the
requirement that, to be crimes against humanity, the inhumane acts must be
“instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group ”. 309 In its
commentary to this requirement, the Commission noted: “The instigation or
direction of a Government or any organization or group, which may not be affiliated
with a Government, gives the act its great dimension and makes it a crime against
humanity imputable to private persons or agents of a State.” 310
146. Jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia accepted
the possibility of non-State actors being prosecuted for crimes against humanity. For
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example, the Trial Chamber in the Tadić case stated that “the law in relation to
crimes against humanity has developed to take into account forces which, although
not those of the legitimate government, have de facto control over, or are able to
move freely within, defined territory”. 311 That finding was echoed in the Limaj
case, where the Trial Chamber viewed the defendant members of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) as prosecutable for crimes against humanity. Among other
things, the Trial Chamber stated:
Although not a legal element of Article 5 [of the statute of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia], evidence of a policy or plan is an
important indication that the acts in question are not merely the workings of
individuals acting pursuant to haphazard or individual design, but instead have
a level of organisational coherence and support of a magnitude sufficient to
elevate them into the realm of crimes against humanity. It stands to reason that
an attack against a civilian population will most often evince the presence of
policy when the acts in question are performed against the backdrop of
significant State action and where formal channels of command can be
discerned. … Special issues arise, however, in considering whether a sub -state
unit or armed opposition group, whether insurrectionist or trans-boundary in
nature, evinces a policy to direct an attack. One requirement such an
organisational unit must demonstrate in order to have sufficient competence to
formulate a policy is a level of de facto control over territory. 312
Ultimately, the Trial Chamber found that while “the KLA evinced a policy to target
those Kosovo Albanians suspected of collaboration with the Serbian authorities, …
there was no attack directed against a civilian population, whether of Serbian or
Albanian ethnicity.” 313
147. Since article 7(a)(2) of the Rome Statute requires that the attack be “pursuant
to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such an attack”,
article 7 expressly contemplates crimes against humanity by non -State perpetrators.
Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Court suggests that “organizational”
includes any organization or group with the capacity and resources to plan and carry
out a widespread or systematic attack. For example, Pre-Trial Chamber I stated in
Katanga: “Such a policy may be made either by groups of persons who govern a
specific territory or by any organization with the capability to commit a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population.” 314
148. In its Kenya Authorization Decision 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the
International Criminal Court took a similar approach, stating “the formal nature of a
group and the level of its organization should not be the defining criterion. Instead,
as others have convincingly put forward, a distinction should be drawn about
whether a group has the capability to perform acts which infringe on basic human
values”. 315 In 2012, the Pre-Trial Chamber stated that, when determining whether a
particular group qualifies as an “organization” under Rome Statute article 7,
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the Chamber may take into account a number of factors, inter alia: (i) whether
the group is under a responsible command, or has an established hierarchy;
(ii) whether the group possesses, in fact, the means to carry out a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population; (iii) whether the group
exercises control over part of the territory of a State; (iv) whether the group
has criminal activities against the civilian population as a primary purpose;
(v) whether the group articulates, explicitly or implicitly, an intention to attack
a civilian population; (vi) whether the group is part of a larger group, which
fulfils some or all of the abovementioned criteria. 316
149. In its 2010 decision, the majority expressly rejected the idea that “only Statelike organizations may qualify” as organizations for the purpose of article 7(a)(2). 317
In his dissent, Judge Kaul agreed that “it is permissive to conclude that an
‘organization’ may be a private entity (a nonstate actor) which is not an organ of a
State or acting on behalf of a State”, but he argued that “those ‘organizations’
should partake of some characteristics of a State”. 318
150. In the Ntaganda case, charges were confirmed against a defendant associated
with two paramilitary groups, the Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) and the
Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo (FPLC) in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. In that instance, the prosecutor contended “that the UPC/FPLC was a
sophisticated and structured political-military organization, akin to the government
of a country, through which Mr. Ntaganda was able to commit crimes against
humanity”. 319 Similarly, in Callixte Mbarushimana, the prosecutor pursued charges
against a defendant associated with the Forces Démocratiques p our la Liberation du
Rwanda (FDLR), described as an “armed group seeking to ‘reconquérir et défendre
la souveraineté nationale’ of Rwanda.” 320 While in that case the majority and the
dissent disagreed on whether there existed a policy of FDLR to attack the c ivilian
population, there appeared to be common ground that FDLR, as a group, could fall
within the scope of article 7. In the case against Joseph Kony relating to the
situation in Uganda, the defendant is allegedly associated with the Lord ’s Resistance
Army, “an armed group carrying out an insurgency against the Government of
Uganda and the Ugandan Army” 321 which “is organised in a military-type hierarchy
and operates as an army”. 322 With respect to the situation in Kenya, Pre-Trial
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Chamber II confirmed charges of crimes against humanity against defendants owing
to their association in a “network” of perpetrators “comprised of eminent ODM
[Orange Democratic Movement] political representatives, representatives of the
media, former members of the Kenyan police and army, Kalenjin elders and local
leaders”. 323 Likewise, charges were confirmed with respect to other defendants
associated with “coordinated attacks that were perpetrated by the Mungiki and
pro-Party of National Unity (‘PNU’) youth in different parts of Nakuru and
Naivasha” that “were targeted at perceived [ODM] supporters using a variety of
means of identification such as lists, physical attributes, roadblocks and language ”. 324

D.

“With knowledge of the attack”
151. The third general requirement is that the perpetrator must commit the act “with
knowledge of the attack”. Jurisprudence from the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda concluded
that the perpetrator must have knowledge that there is an attack on the civilian
population and, further, that his or her act is a part of that attack. 325 This two-part
approach is reflected in the International Criminal Court ’s Elements of Crimes,
which for each of the proscribed acts requires as that act ’s last element: “The
perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be part of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. ” Even so,
the last element should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the
perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of the attack or the precise
details of the plan or policy of the State or organization. In the case of an
emerging widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, the
intent clause of the last element indicates that this mental element is satisfied
if the perpetrator intended to further such an attack. 326
It need not be proven that the perpetrator knew the specific details of the attack; 327
rather, the perpetrator ’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial
evidence. 328 Thus, when finding in the Bemba case that the MLC troops acted with
knowledge of the attack, Pre-Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Court
stated that the troops’ knowledge could be “inferred from the methods of the attack
they followed”, which reflected a clear pattern. 329 In the Katanga case, the Court’s
Pre-Trial Chamber I found that
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knowledge of the attack and the perpetrator ’s awareness that his conduct was
part of such attack may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, s uch as: the
accused’s position in the military hierarchy; his assuming an important role in
the broader criminal campaign; his presence at the scene of the crimes; his
references to the superiority of his group over the enemy group; and the
general historical and political environment in which the acts occurred. 330
152. Further, the personal motive of the perpetrator for taking part in the attack is
irrelevant; the perpetrator does not need to share the purpose or goal of the broader
attack. 331 According to the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia in Kunarac, evidence that the perpetrator committed the
prohibited acts for personal reasons could at most “be indicative of a rebuttable
assumption that he was not aware that his acts were part of that attack”. 332 It is the
perpetrator’s knowledge or intent that his or her act is part of the attack that is
relevant to satisfying this requirement. Additionally, this element will be satisfied
where it can be proven that the underlying offence was committed by directly taking
advantage of the broader attack, or where the commission of the underlying offence
had the effect of perpetuating the broader attack. 333 For example, in the Kunarac
case, the perpetrators were accused of various forms of sexual violence, acts of
torture and enslavement against Muslim women and girls. The Trial Chamber of the
Court found that the accused had the requisite knowledge because they not only
knew of the attack against the Muslim civilian population, but also pe rpetuated the
attack “by directly taking advantage of the situation created ” and “fully embraced
the ethnicity-based aggression.” 334

E.

Types of prohibited acts
153. Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute, in subparagraphs (a) to (k), lists the
underlying prohibited acts for crimes against humanity. These prohibited acts also
appear as part of the definition of crimes against humanity contained in article 18 of
the Commission’s 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, although the language differs slightly. Article 7(2), in subparagraphs (b)
to (i), provides further definitions of these prohibited acts. An individual who
commits one of these acts can commit a crime against humanity; the individual need
not have committed multiple acts, but the individual’s act must be “a part of” a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population. 335 The
underlying offence does not need to be committed in the heat of the attack against
the civilian population to satisfy this requirement; the underlying offence can be
part of the attack if it can be sufficiently connected to the attack. 336
154. Murder. Article 7(1)(a)of the Rome Statute identifies murder as a prohibited
act. According to the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes, the act of
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murder means that “the perpetrator killed one or more persons”. 337 The term
“killed” can be used interchangeably with “caused death”. 338 Murder was included
as an act falling within the scope of crimes against humanity in article 6(c) of th e
Nuremberg Charter; Control Council Law No. 10; the statutes of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda; and the 1954 draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
Mankind and 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind
of the International Law Commission. 339
155. Extermination. Article 7(1)(b) of the Rome Statute identifies extermination as
a prohibited act. Article 7(2)(b) provides that extermination “includes the intentional
infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and
medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population ”. To
commit the act of extermination, according to the International Criminal C ourt’s
Elements of Crimes, the perpetrator must have “killed one or more persons,
including by inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of
part of a population”. 340 These conditions “could include the deprivation of access
to food and medicine”. 341 Killing, in the context of the act of extermination, can be
either direct or indirect, and can take various forms. 342 The conduct must also have
“constituted, or [taken] place as part of, a mass killing of members of a civilian
population”. 343 Although extermination, like genocide, involves an element of mass
destruction, it differs from the crime of genocide in that it covers situations in which
a group of individuals who do not have any shared characteristics are killed as well
as situations in which some members of a group are killed while others are not. 344
Extermination was included as an act falling within the scope of crimes against
humanity in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter; Control Council Law No. 10; the
statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; and the draft codes of the International
Law Commission. 345
156. Enslavement. Article 7(1)(c) of the Rome Statute identifies enslavement as a
prohibited act. Article 7(2)(c) defines enslavement as “the exercise of any or all of
the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the
exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women
and children”. The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes provides that
such an exercise of power includes “purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a
person or persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty ”. 346
Elements of Crimes also notes: “It is understood that such deprivation of liberty
may, in some circumstances, include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a
person to a servile status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to
__________________
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Slavery of 1956.” 347 Enslavement was included as an act falling within the scope of
crimes against humanity in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter; Control Council
Law No. 10; the statutes of the International Tribunal for the Fo rmer Yugoslavia and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; and the draft codes of the
International Law Commission. 348 Article 3(a) of the 2000 Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, 349 defines “trafficking in persons” as the “recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the
purpose of exploitation”.
157. Deportation or forcible transfer of population. Article 7(1)(d) of the Rome
Statute identifies forcible transfer of population as a prohibited act. Article 7(2)(d)
defines deportation or forcible transfer of population as “forced displacement of the
persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they
are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law. ” The
International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes states that the term “forcibly” is
not limited to physical force, and may include the threat of coercion or force, “such
as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power against such person or persons or another person, or by taking
advantage of a coercive environment”. 350 According to Elements of Crimes, the
perpetrator must also be aware of the factual circumstances establishing that the
persons are lawfully present in the area from which they were displaced. 351
Elements of Crimes also notes that “deported or forcibly transferred” can be used
interchangeably with “forcibly displaced”. 352 “Grounds permitted under
international law” can include legitimate reasons for transfer such as public health
or welfare. 353 Deportation was included as an act falling within the scope of crimes
against humanity in article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter; Control Council Law
No. 10; the statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; and the draft codes of the Inter national
Law Commission. 354
158. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty. Article 7(1)(e) of
the Rome Statute identifies as a prohibited act imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty. To commit this prohibited act unde r the Rome
Statute, the perpetrator must have “imprisoned one or more persons or otherwise
severely deprived one or more persons of physical liberty”. 355 Additionally, the
conduct must be “in violation of the fundamental rules of international law”. 356
Arbitrary imprisonment is a violation of individual human rights recognized in
__________________
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article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 9 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 357 Subparagraph (e) also
includes large-scale or systematic cases of imprisonment, such as concentration
camps. 358 According to the International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes, the
perpetrator must also be “aware of the factual circumstances that established the
gravity of the conduct”. 359 Imprisonment was included as an act falling within the
scope of crimes against humanity in Control Council Law No. 10, the statutes of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda; and the 1996 draft code of the International Law
Commission. 360
159. Torture. Article 7(1)(f) of the Rome Statute identifies torture as a prohibited
act. Article 7(2)(e) defines torture as “the intentional infliction of severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the
control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising
only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions. ” The International Criminal
Court’s Elements of Crimes provides that “no specific purpose need be proved for
this crime”. 361 This definition of torture mirrors the definition found in article 1(1)
of the Convention against Torture, but removes the specific purposes
requirement. 362 Torture was included as an act falling within the scope of crime s
against humanity in Control Council Law No. 10, the statutes of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and the 1996 draft code of the International Law Commission. 363
160. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity .
Article 7(1)(g) of the of the Rome Statute identifies as prohibited acts rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity. Each of these acts is addressed
below.
161. Rape. Rape was included as an act falling within the scope of crimes against
humanity in Control Council Law No. 10, the statutes of the International Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and
__________________
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the 1996 draft code of the International Law Commission. 364 Owing to the accounts
of rape committed in a widespread or systematic manner i n the former Yugoslavia,
the General Assembly in 1995 unanimously reaffirmed that rape falls within the
scope of crimes against humanity when the other elements of the offence are
satisfied. 365
162. The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes defines the act of rape
as an act by which “the perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct
resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of
the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of t he victim
with any object or any other part of the body.” 366 This invasion must be “committed
by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence,
duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such pe rson
or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion
was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent ”. 367 Elements
of Crimes notes that a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent for
reasons such as “natural, induced, or age-related incapacity”. 368 Elements of Crimes
also notes that the act of rape under crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute is
intended to be gender-neutral. 369 These elements were interpreted in some depth for
the first time by Trial Chamber II in the Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui cases. 370
163. Sexual slavery. Sexual slavery is listed as a separate prohibited act in
article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute, rather than as a form of enslavement under
article 7(1)(c). The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes defines
sexual slavery as an act by which the “perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing,
selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a
similar deprivation of liberty”. 371 Such a deprivation of liberty could include
“exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status as defined
in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of S lavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956 ”. 372 Additionally, the
perpetrator must have “caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts
of a sexual nature”. 373 Elements of Crimes also notes that due to the “complex
nature of this crime, it is recognized that its commission could involve more than
__________________
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one perpetrator as a part of a common criminal purpose”. 374 These elements were
also interpreted in some depth for the first time by the Trial Chamber II in the
Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui cases. 375
164. Enforced prostitution. It has been suggested that the crime of “enforced
prostitution” was included in the Rome Statute “to capture those situations that lack
slavery-like conditions”. 376 The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes
defines enforced prostitution as an act by which
the perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or more acts of a
sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by
fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of
power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking
advantage of a coercive environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to
give genuine consent. 377
Elements of Crimes also identifies an additional element: that “the perpetrator or
another person obtained or expected to obtain pecuniary or other advantage in
exchange for or in connection with the acts of a sexual nature ”. 378 Enforced
prostitution was included as an act falling within the scop e of crimes against
humanity in the International Law Commission’s 1996 draft Code of Crimes against
the Peace and Security of Mankind. 379
165. Forced pregnancy. Article 7(2)(f) of the Rome Statute defines forced
pregnancy 380 as “the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant,
with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out
other grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be
interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy”. 381
166. Enforced sterilization. Following the Second World War, several defendants
were found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity for medical
experiments, including sterilization, conducted in concentration camps. 382 Forced
sterilization can also amount to genocide when committed with the requisite intent
to destroy a particular group in whole or in part, as a form of “imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group” under article 6(d) of the Rome
Statute. 383 The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes defines enforced
sterilization as an act by which the “perpetrator deprived one or more persons of
biological reproductive capacity”. 384 Additionally, Elements of Crimes establishes
that the conduct must not have been “justified by the medical or hospital treatment
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of the person or persons concerned nor carried out with their genuine consent ”. 385
Elements of Crimes includes a footnote to the first element, stating: “The
deprivation is not intended to include birth-control measures which have a
non-permanent effect in practice.” 386
167. Any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity. In the Akayesu case
at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the defendant was prosecuted for
sexual violence as crimes against humanity, on the basis that such violence fell
within the scope of “other inhumane acts”. 387 The Trial Chamber in Akayesu, in
defining “sexual violence” in the context of crimes against humanity, said:
The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, as any act of a
sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are
coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human
body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical
contact. 388
The Tribunal found that the act of forcing a woman to undress and perform
gymnastics in front of a crowd constituted sexual violence amounting to inhumane
acts. 389 The Tribunal also noted that in this context, evidence of physical force is
not necessary to demonstrate coercive circumstances. 390 The 1996 draft Code of
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind also included “other forms of
sexual abuse” as a prohibited act in its definition of crimes against humanity. 391 The
International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes defines this prohibited act as one
in which the “perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more
persons or caused such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by
force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence,
duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person
or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or
such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent”. 392 This element
appears consistent with the Trial Chamber ’s approach in Akayesu and incorporates
the same broad definition of coercion. Additionally, the conduct must be of
comparable gravity to the other offences enumerated in article 7, par agraph 1(g), of
the Rome Statute. 393 Elements of Crimes also provides that the perpetrator must
have been “aware of the factual circumstances that established the gravity of the
conduct”. 394
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168. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity. Article 7(1)(h) of
the Rome Statute identifies as a prohibited act “persecution against any identifiable
group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender
as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as
impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in ”
paragraph 1 as a whole or in connection with acts of genocide or war crimes.
Article 7(2)(g) defines persecution as “the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the
group or collectivity”. The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes
clarifies that the crime of persecution includes targeting individuals because of their
membership in the group or collectivity, as well as targeting the group or
collectivity as a whole. 395 Persecution may take many forms, with its central
characteristic being the denial of fundamental human rights that every individual is
entitled to without distinction. 396 The importance of this notion can be seen in
Article 1(3) of the Charter of the United Nations, which provides for “respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms of all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion”, as well as article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. 397 Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute applies to acts of
persecution that do not have the specific intent necessary to constitute the crime of
genocide. 398 Persecution on political, racial or religious grounds was included as an
act falling within the scope of crimes against humanity in article 6(c) of the
Nuremberg Charter; Control Council Law No. 10; the statutes of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda; and the draft codes of the International Law Commission. 399
169. Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome Statute prohibits persecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity on several grounds, including gender. The Rome
Statute was the first international legal instrument to explicitly list gender
persecution as a crime. 400 Article 7(3) defines gender as “the two sexes, male and
female, within the context of society. The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any
meaning different from the above”. In United Nations usage, “the word ‘sex’ is used
to refer to physical and biological characteristics of women and men, while gender
is used to refer to the explanations for observed differences between women and
men based on socially assigned roles.” 401 The phrase “in the context of society” in
__________________
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paragraph 3 then can be interpreted to refer to these socially constructed roles and
differences assigned to both sexes. 402 Hence, the use of “gender” as opposed to
“sex” in the Statute is more inclusive. 403
170. Enforced disappearance of persons. Article 7(1)(i) of the Rome Statute
identifies enforced disappearance of persons as a prohibited act. Article 7(2)(i)
defines enforced disappearance of persons as “the arrest, detention or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of
freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the
intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time”. In 1992, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, stating that “enforced disappearance
undermines the deepest values of any society committed to respect for the rule of
law, human rights and fundamental freedoms” and that “the systematic practice of
such acts is of the nature of a crime against humanity ”. 404 The definition of
enforced disappearance of persons in article 7(2)(i) of the Rome Statute uses nearly
the same language as appears in the 1992 United Nations declaration. 405
171. Forced disappearance was included as an act falling within the scope of crimes
against humanity in the 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Secu rity of
Mankind, whose commentary referred to the 1992 United Nations Declaration and
the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons for
definitions of the prohibited act. 406 The Commission stated in its commentary that
forced disappearance was included as an act falling within the scope of crimes
against humanity “because of its extreme cruelty and gravity”. 407 As noted in
paragraph 86 above, in 2006 the General Assembly adopted the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. Article 5
of the Convention provides: “The widespread or systematic practice of enforced
disappearance constitutes a crime against humanity as defined in applicable
international law and shall attract the consequences provid ed for under such
applicable international law.” 408
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172. The International Criminal Court’s Elements of Crimes does not separately
address the elements for perpetrators involved in the deprivation of liberty and the
elements pertaining to perpetrators involved in the refusal or denial; rather, the two
types of conduct are addressed together. According to the first element, the
perpetrator must have either “arrested, detained, or abducted one or more persons ”
or “refused to acknowledge the arrest, detention or abduction, or to give information
on the fate or whereabouts of such person or persons”. 409 Footnotes clarify that the
term “detained” includes “a perpetrator who maintained an existing detention” and
that “under certain circumstances an arrest or detention may have been lawful”. 410
The second element requires that the arrest, detention or abduction be followed or
accompanied by a refusal to acknowledge or to give information, or that the “refusal
was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of freedom”. 411 The third element
requires that the perpetrator be aware that either the “arrest, detention or abduction
would be followed in the ordinary course of events by a refusal ” or that the “refusal
was preceded or accompanied by that deprivation of freedom”. 412 The fourth
element requires that the “arrest, detention or abduction was carried out by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization ”,
while the fifth element requires that the refusal be with “authorization or support of,
such State or political organization”. 413 The sixth element requires that the
“perpetrator intended to remove such person or persons from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time”. 414 A footnote indicates: “Given the complex
nature of this crime, it is recognized that its commission will normally involve more
than one perpetrator as a part of a common criminal purpose. ” 415
173. Apartheid. Article 1 of the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid provides: “The States parties to the
present Convention declare that apartheid is a crime against humanity. ” 416 The 1996
draft code included what the Commission called “the crime of apartheid under a
more general denomination” 417 by referring to institutionalized discrimination on
racial, ethnic or religious grounds as crimes against humanity.
174. Article 7(1)(j) of the Rome Statute expressly identifies the crime of apartheid
as a prohibited act. Article 7(2)(h) defines the crime of apartheid as “inhumane acts
of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context
of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial
group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of
maintaining that regime”.
175. Other inhumane acts. Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute identifies as
prohibited acts other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
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suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. In the
commentary to its 1996 draft code, the Commission explained the inclusion of
“other inhumane acts” by recognizing that “it was impossible to establish an
exhaustive list of the inhumane acts which might constitute crimes against
humanity”. 418 The 1996 draft code includes two examples of the types of acts that
would qualify as “other inhumane acts” as crimes against humanity: mutilation and
severe bodily harm. 419 Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, Control Council Law
No. 10 and the statutes of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda included “other inhumane acts” in
their definitions of crimes against humanity. 420

F.

Draft article 2: Definition of crimes against humanity
176. The definition of crimes against humanity as set forth in article 7 of the Rome
Statute represents a widely-accepted definition of settled international law. 421 As
such, for the present draft articles, it should be used verbatim except for three
non-substantive changes, which are necessary given the different context in which
the definition is being used. First, the opening phrase of paragraph 1 should read
“For the purpose of the present draft articles” rather than “For the purpose of this
Statute”. Second, the same change is necessary in the opening phrase of paragraph 3.
Third, article 7(1)(h) Rome Statute criminalizes acts of persecution when
undertaken “in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court”. Again, to adapt to the different context, this
phrase should instead read “in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph
or in connection with acts of genocide or war crimes”. 422
177. Bearing these considerations in mind, the Special Rapporteur proposes the
following draft article:
Draft article 2
Definition of crimes against humanity
1.
For the purpose of the present draft articles, “crime against
humanity” means any of the following acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack:
(a)

Murder;

(b)

Extermination;

(c)

Enslavement;

__________________
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(d)

Deportation or forcible transfer of population;

(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical libe rty in
violation of fundamental rules of international law;
(f)

Torture;

(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible
under international law, in connection with any act referr ed to in this
paragraph or in connection with acts of genocide or war crimes;
(i)

Enforced disappearance of persons;

(j)

The crime of apartheid;

(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
2.

For the purpose of paragraph 1:

(a) “Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
organizational policy to commit such attack;
(b) “Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of
life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to
bring about the destruction of part of a population;
(c) “Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of
such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and
children;
(d) “Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts
from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted
under international law;
(e) “Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under
the control of the accused, except that torture shall not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;
(f) “Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of
any population or carrying out other grave violations of in ternational law. This
definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws
relating to pregnancy;
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(g) “Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the id entity of
the group or collectivity;
(h) “The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a character
similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an
institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one raci al
group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention
of maintaining that regime;
(i) “Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescenc e of,
a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of
those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
3.
For the purposes of the present draft articles, it is understood that
the term “gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context
of society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the
above.

VII. Future programme of work
178. A tentative “road map” for the completion of work on this topic is as follows.
179. A second report, to be submitted in 2016, will likely address the obligation of
a State party to take any necessary measures to ensure that crimes against humanity
constitute an offence under national law; the obligation to take any necessary
measures to establish the State party’s competence to exercise jurisdiction over the
offence; the obligation of each State party to take an alleged offender in any
territory under its jurisdiction into custody and carry out an investigation of the
alleged offence; the obligation to submit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution, unless the person is extradited to a nother State or
surrendered to an international court or tribunal; and the entitlement of the alleged
offender to fair treatment, including a fair trial.
180. The subsequent programme of work on the topic will be for the members of
the Commission elected for the quinquennium 2017-2021 to determine. A possible
timetable would be for a third report to be submitted in 2017, which could address a
State Party’s obligation to investigate an alleged offence in circumstances where the
alleged offender is not present; rights and obligations applicable to the extradition
of the alleged offender; and rights and obligations applicable to mutual legal
assistance in connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of an alleged
offence of crimes against humanity.
181. A fourth report, to be submitted in 2018, could address all further matters,
such as dispute settlement, as well as a preamble and concluding articles to the
convention.
182. If such a timetable is maintained, it is anticipated that a first reading of the
entire set of draft articles could be completed by 2018 and a second reading could
be completed by 2020.
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Annex
Proposed draft articles
Draft article 1
Prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity
1.
Each State Party confirms that crimes against humanity, whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war, are crimes under international law
which it undertakes to prevent and punish.
2.
Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial
or other measures to prevent crimes against humanity in any territory under its
jurisdiction.
3.
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be
invoked as a justification of crimes against humanity.
Draft article 2
Definition of crimes against humanity
1.
For the purpose of the present draft articles, “crime against humanity”
means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the
attack:
a.

Murder;

b.

Extermination;

c.

Enslavement;

d.

Deportation or forcible transfer of population;

e.
Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation
of fundamental rules of international law;
f.

Torture;

g.
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
h.
Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political,
racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph o r in connection with acts of
genocide or war crimes;
i.

Enforced disappearance of persons;

j.

The crime of apartheid;

k.
Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
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2.

For the purpose of paragraph 1:

a.
“Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against
any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy to commit such attack;
b.
“Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life,
inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about
the destruction of part of a population;
c.
“Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching
to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in
the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children;
d.
“Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced
displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the
area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under
international law;
e.
“Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the
accused, except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;
f.
“Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman
forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any
population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This
definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to
pregnancy;
g.
“Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the
group or collectivity;
h.
“The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a character similar to
those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized
regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other
racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime;
i.
“Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or
abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a
State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that
deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those
persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.
3.
For the purposes of the present draft articles, it is understood that the
term “gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of
society. The term “gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above.
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